Victory, but then what?

Palestinian opinions on the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the prospects of self-governance

By Jon Pedersen, Research Director at Fafo

At last, it seems, Palestinians consider that they have a reason to celebrate a victory. In a recent poll, as many as 61 percent of respondents in the Gaza strip hold that Israel withdrew from Gaza because of the Palestinian struggle, and 23 consider that it became to costly for Israel to stay. Only 12 percent say that the withdrawal was a result of international pressure.

The Norwegian research institute Fafo carried out the poll of 875 Palestinians aged 18 and above on the Gaza Strip during the first ten days of September while the Israeli Defense Force was reducing the vacated settlements and military installations to rubble. It showed broad support for the withdrawal. As many as 96 percent supported it, and 75 percent also support how the Palestinian Authority has handled the withdrawal.

Palestinians are also generally optimistic about the changes that may come, - 88 percent believe that the economy will improve, and about the same percentage that the pull-out will make Palestinian outside of the Gaza Strip want to invest in the private sector there.

Whether this positive feeling has brought Israel security is another matter. As many as 38 percent hold that the intifada should continue, although not necessarily with violent means. Thus 67 percent agree that 'military operations against Israel from the Gaza Strip', should now cease, about 33 percent think that they should not. And support for suicide bombings is strong, but not universal: 61 percent think that suicide bombings against Israeli civilians are necessary to make Israel move on the political front.

In classic Al-Qaeda style, Hamas militant Mohammed Deif recently released a video where he urged the armed struggle to continue. About 26 percent of Gazans have seen the video, and about two third of those agree with it. It is nevertheless difficult to know if the support for armed attacks is sufficiently strong for militants to consider it politically expedient to launch attacks from the Gaza strip, given that the people in Gaza may now be less willing to suffer the consequences of Israeli retaliation. Probably it means that militants will test the water with limited attacks, both to discover how Israel will react, and to gauge the effect on their support within the Gaza Strip.

While Palestinians may be optimistic on the economic front, they are less so on the political. One of the facts of external conflict is that it leaves little outlet for orderly resolution of internal differences. In stead of constructing institutions that can solve civil and political conflicts peacefully, Palestinians have built up a multitude of security forces, and political groups have responded by arming themselves, not only for the fight against Israel, but also for their internal fights. Now 59 percent of the respondents think that the Israeli pull-out will escalate power struggles between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. As many as 15 percent thinks that such struggles will be armed, and 29 percent that they may possibly be so.

It is not surprising that the 44 percent of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip consider creation of jobs and 22 percent the general economic situation as the most important issues to be tackled following the pull-out. Before the first Intifada, and in the lull before the second, the economy Gaza was to a large extent founded on wage labor in Israel and public administration (in which one should include international organizations such as the UN aid organization for Palestine refugees, UNRWA and NGOs). According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, unemployment stood at 30 percent during the second quarter of 2005. For youth, aged 20-24 it was as high as 48 percent. There is no lack of young men without something to do in Gaza.

Contrary to what is often believed, the Gaza Strip has so far not slid into abject poverty because of the conflict, but it is in the process of developing a classic third world city economy, based not on production, but only on unpaid family work, petty trading, the public sector and support from outside.

The international support has been very important. Less than 5 percent consider infrastructure improvement, improvements in the health system or in education as immediate priorities. This reflects perhaps that Gaza is fairly well served with basic services, as a result infant mortality is for instance at 30 deaths per thousand, which is better than for neighboring Egypt and slightly higher than Romania. However, in contrast to Jordan, which 10 years ago had the same level as the Gaza Strip, infant mortality has not been reduced during the last decade.

External observers often focus on the conflict between the Islamists, in particular Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority as the main source of insecurity in the Gaza Strip. But ordinary crime is reported by respondents as a more important problem. Only 7 percent consider Palestinian factional fighting as the most important problem, while 18 percent find it to be general lawlessness and crime. However, as in many other conflict areas, the two are intertwined, and where political violence stops and crime begins may be difficult to judge. Violent political infighting creates a milieu where violent crime thrives.

As many as 38 percent state unequivocally that the Palestinian Authority will be able to control violent political strife in the Gaza Strip, and only 5 percent unambiguously that they will not. However, 48 percent think that such control is contingent on cooperation between the various political factions, which, of course, is the question to begin with. Moreover, 21 percent do not think that the PA is serious in its efforts to improve security - a figure that may increase after the murder of former security chief Mousa Arafat on September 7, as many have seen the PA security reaction as extremely muted.

Who will then be able to control the Gaza Strip? The findings are not encouraging, because residents appear as bewildered as observers. The poll asked if the respondents had general confidence in various institutions. The Palestinian Authority government score about 20 percent, as does the legislative assembly and foreign companies and NGOs. Local community leaders and political parties around 40 percent, only 10 percent more than banks and financial institutions and Palestinian NGOs. The only institution that is able to claim substantial trust is UNRWA with 78 percent.

One reason for the lack of legitimacy of the institutions of the Palestinian Authority is corruption. When asked if the Palestinian Authority is serious about its plans to quell corruption, 72 percent say that they believe so. However, when asked if they think the land vacated by the Israelis will be distributed fairly by the land commission, only 53 percent think so.

As many as 95 percent of the respondents in the poll support the creation of a national coalition government, and 78 percent think that it will end the current political crisis. Most, 88 percent, think that Hamas should participate. However, support for Hamas is not overwhelming in general, 20 percent say that they will vote for Hamas in the January legislative council elections, and 6 percent they will vote for independent Islamists. In contrast, 33 percent will vote for Fatah, and 5 for independent nationalists. More striking than the support each faction has, is the fact that 35 percent have not made up their mind. This point is brought home even more strongly by a question on what candidates that will receive their support, where 56 percent say that they will decide later.

Israel probably made a wise decision to withdraw. Yes, because of the hopefully positive effects on the staggering peace process, and yes, because they should have done so years ago or never entered in the first place. But also from a purely selfish interest in that the internal conflicts in Gaza may have reached a stage where Israel, had it stayed, would have had to intervene much more heavy handedly in the internal security in the Gaza Strip. This would probably have brought Israel a situation resembling a small scale version of Baghdad, with its peculiar mix of militant attacks, political violence for pay, factional violence and violent crime. Now, the Palestinian Authority is the one facing that prospect.

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