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and Dag Tuastad

Finding Ways

Palestinian Coping Strategies
in Changing Environments

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Preface

More than ever, we all realize how exposed the Middle East peace process is. The peace process is vulnerable, prone to setbacks, being simultaneously assailed from many sides. But it is also resilient. The peace process survives in spite of the heavy odds stacked against it, because there is no realistic and viable alternative. The level of activities in, as well as the spirit of, the Refugee Working Group in the Multilateral Peace Process in the Middle East, testify to the fact that discussions will not be broken off but will continue even in moments of crisis. "Finding Ways" is offered by FAFO as a contribution to ongoing reflections in the RWG on the situation of Palestinian refugees in the region.

The new study, "Finding Ways", is different from the sample surveys that FAFO has conducted earlier. Both "Palestinian Society" (1993) and "Responding to Change" (1994) were quantitative studies based on a representative sample of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. The main aim of "Finding Ways" has been to describe different coping strategies of Palestinian families living as refugees, using a qualitative approach. The geographic scope of "Finding Ways" reflects a broader political concern, namely that the plight of refugees outside the West Bank and Gaza should not be forgotten as Palestinian self-rule is implemented. Since the signing of the Declaration of Principles in Washington September 13, 1993, international attention has increasingly been directed to include Palestinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza.

"Finding Ways" is based on fieldwork in four sites: the Rashiddiya refugee camp in South Lebanon, the Askar camp in the West Bank, the Whidat and Baqa'a camp in Jordan, and Palestinian neighbourhoods in Amman. Through case studies we hope to capture some of the dynamics of social and economic adaptation in the different camps and countries. We have chosen to focus on decision making units, the formal relation to the host-society, the construction of community and economic adaptation.

"Finding Ways" would not have been possible without support from numerous individuals and institutions in the area. Special thanks go to the Palestinian families who extended their hospitality and openness to the FAFO researchers during fieldwork. The Palestinian field-assistants and translators have a major share in the end result.

Our thanks are also extended to the Jordanian Government for its support for and keen appreciation of the project. We are indeed grateful for the many useful comments to the draft report at the expert

intersessional meeting in Oslo in October 1994, from Dr. Ahmad Katanani, Adviser to the Prime Minister and Mr. Abdul Karim Abul Haja, Director of Information and Public Relations Department of Palestinian Affairs.

Let me also express our gratitude to the PLO for its continuing support of our work. We are fortunate in having a close working relationship with Dr. Salim Tamari and Professor Eliah Zureik. Their comments have, as always, been critical and constructive and it is our hope that it will be possible to follow up some of their proposals in a new study on this topic.

In Israel, Middle East Coordinator Daniel Nevo and Dr. Zvi Eisenbach at the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, have once again been of valuable help. Their advice has definitely contributed to an improved end product.

Support from the UN system, and UNRWA in particular, has been highly appreciated. We are grateful for useful discussions during fieldwork with research officer Lee O'Brien, and for support from personnel at UNRWA Headquarters in Vienna, in particular Special Advisor to the Commissioner-General, Yves Besson.

We are grateful that the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a special interest in the project, providing full funding for the project. Warm thanks go to the Middle East desk at the Foreign Ministry: Special Coordinator for Middle East Affairs, Ambassador Rolf Trolle Andersen, Minister Counselor Hans Fredrik Lehne, Deputy Director General Rolf Willy Hansen and Executive Officer Unni Kløvstad.

"Finding Ways" is the result of assistance from a multitude of sources, and an impressive and collective effort by the five authors of the report: Research Director Jon Pedersen, researchers Signe Gilen, Are Hovdenak, Rania Maktabi and Dag Tuastad. They all worked with vigour and thoroughness, and managed to write a fascinating first account of Palestinian coping strategies. They were helped by useful comments and suggestions from Professor Fredrik Barth and Professor Unni Wikan, both of the University of Oslo.

"Finding Ways" will best serve its purpose if it contributes to an open debate among researchers and policy makers. Let me also emphasize that though we fully appreciate the comments and advice we have received, the substantive content, including the assessments in "Finding Ways" are of course the sole responsibility of FAFO.

Geir O. Pedersen

Director
Centre for International Studies, FAFO
Oslo, November 1994

Introduction

The Declaration of Principles (DoP) between the PLO and Israel and the subsequent agreements establishing the Palestinian National Authority in Gaza and Jericho have profoundly altered the political, social and economic developments in the Middle East. Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, in Lebanon, Syria and in Jordan are apt to respond in diverse ways to the DoP, as they have to the wide range of political events and economic shocks which have affected their daily life since 1948.

These responses take a variety of forms, and the purpose of the present report is to document some of the strategies and adaptations that the Palestinians have made, in the context of a rapidly changing socio-political environment. A particular focus is how the responses have created or severed links between the Palestinians and the societies where they live, and how those links may influence population movements and mobility.


The data on which this report is founded were produced during four field works in July 1994 in Jordan, Lebanon and the West Bank. Each field work lasted for about a month, and anthropological methods were used. In Jordan two studies were carried out, one in *Wihdat* camp (Amman New Camp) as well as one in *Baq'a* camp. The other Jordanian field work concentrated on several neighbourhoods in Amman inhabited by Palestinians. In Lebanon the inhabitants of the *Rashidiyya* camp in the south extended their hospitality to the FAFO researcher, while in the West Bank the research concentrated on the camp of *Askar* (see map 1).

Given the locations of study, it is clear that the research focuses on Palestinians in diverse situations, and that it cannot claim representativeness in any quantitative sense. Neither has that been the intention. The aim has been to describe types of strategies and processes, not to count their outcomes. Given the focus, a more quantitative aim would have been difficult to achieve and perhaps also meaningless. First, the outcomes are emergent and dependent on rapidly changing circumstances. The ongoing peace process, for instance, has still not materialised into clear-cut outcomes which Palestinians can actually respond to and act towards. Therefore, it is mainly the responses to the political and economic impacts prior to the Declaration of Principles that constitute the focus of the present report.

Second, although the population is well defined in the sense that a definite set of people define themselves and are defined by others as

Palestinians, it is not easy to construct a sample frame in relation to the present purpose. The Palestinians we met during our fieldwork in the

Map 1: Palestinian Refugee camps in the Middle East



Source: Based on UNWRA's map of area of operations, 30 June 1993.

camps, therefore, represent neither the complete range of coping strategies nor of opinions of all Palestinians in their current country of residence. People who, for instance, have migrated, are no longer present in the areas concerned.

We also do not claim representativity in the structural sense of depicting the Palestinian *society*. Like most other societies, Palestinian society is too diverse to lend itself to a coherent description of an overall structure, and we should be wary of painting an idealised picture. As Edward Said points out:

“There are many different kinds of Palestinian experience, which cannot all be assembled into one. One would therefore have to write parallel histories of the communities in Lebanon, the occupied territories, and so on. That is the central problem. It is almost impossible to imagine a single narrative . . .” (Said 1991:179)

Where we do claim certain generalisations of our results, however, is in the portrayal of the kind of processes and strategies that we have found people to be involved in. While the diverse Palestinian communities, households or persons may be seen as having their own “specific paths through modernity” (Clifford 1988:5) there is still some unity in the kinds of paths taken and the forces shaping those paths.

When people act, their actions cannot be but shaped by the socio-economic environment in which they live. To the extent that this environment exhibits a certain order, the acts must reflect that order, if they are to be successful adaptations to the situations that confront the actors. If acts may be assumed to be rational, insight into the actors' perception of the situation, the deliberations made and the acts performed are indispensable building blocks for the analysis. An important method employed here for discovering those building blocks is that of the analysis of case histories, i.e. analysis of sequences of acts seen as responses to particular events, concerns and challenges by the actors. During field work some effort was also put into the description and analysis of local classifications of social phenomena. This was partly achieved through the use of adaptations of the so called “Rapid Rural Appraisal” framework (Chambers 1983).

From the field works several areas of social organisation emerged as particularly salient, and these also guide the plan of the report.

First, Palestinians came from several backgrounds and walks of life. They were towns people, peasants, workers or merchants to name but a few. The refugee situation destroyed some social bonds, and created

others. For instance, the corporate clan (*hamula*)¹ among the villagers often lost its importance in the new setting. Also, new social groups have grown up, such as societies based on a town or village of origin among Palestinians living in Amman. Accordingly, in order to analyse acts and responses, we have to delineate the bodies acting, i.e. decision making units. To some extent this is dependent on local contexts, but we have also found it useful to describe some general traits throughout the report.

Second, the host-societies where refugees settled had to adapt to the Palestinians, just as the Palestinians have adapted to the societies where they find themselves. This adaptation has sometimes been easy, but more often difficult, if only for the huge numbers of refugees involved. The mutual adaptations have had different outcomes in different countries. An important aspect of the adaptation of the new society in which refugees became part of is how governments in the different states have constructed the formal rights that the Palestinians enjoy and the duties they are subject to. In addition, the definition of rights and duties is one thing, their implementation and execution by government bodies another. The Palestinians, on their side, accommodate themselves to the formal system of rights and duties and its administrative expressions in a number of ways. This is dealt with in chapter 3.

A third area which came out of the field works is what one may term the social construction of locality, i.e. how social relations torn by displacement have been reconstructed, transformed or where new forms of social organisation have grown up. In some cases the Palestinians have created, been forced to create or been assigned communities that are totally distinct from adjacent neighbourhoods, in others they are incorporated or assimilated.

Locality is often thought of as a *situated* community, such as a refugee camp, a village or a neighbourhood in a city. However, it is useful to extend the concept to social networks and categories that are not necessarily tied to a specific place, but that are still local in the sense that subjects can be known and organised (Appadurai 1993). Examples of such localities are the networks of middle-class Palestinians in Amman, or the far flung networks of Palestinian emigrants and their families. Indeed, one may argue that such a concept of locality is particularly well suited to the Palestinian experience of dislocation, exile and Diaspora. The construction of locality is dealt with in chapter 4.

A final area is that of economic adaptation. Being both a result and a determinant of the factors discussed above, the economic adaptations

¹ The *hamula* is a patrilineal descent group. Among peasants, it was usually localized, and had great genealogical depth.

of Palestinian in the various settings take different forms. Our concern here is to discuss some of the constraints and opportunities represented by the economic adaptations with regard to mobility.

Adaptation - economic, social or political - takes several forms. It is useful to distinguish between the different ideal types of adaptation, although real-world examples assumes intermediate forms².

Adaptation may take the form of *assimilation*, namely that the group merges with the surrounding society and becomes an indiscernible part of that society. For instance, in Amman, some upper-class Palestinians represent a population segment which reveals a certain degree of assimilation into the affluent mixed Jordanian-Palestinian neighbourhood of Jabal Amman.

A diametrically opposite form of adaptation is that of *segregation* where the group makes out a separate entity in contrast to the surrounding society. An example would be the situation during the civil war in Lebanon, where the refugee camps formed isolated enclaves in the wider Lebanese society. A third form is what we will term *incorporation*. By being incorporated in the society, the group retains its identity, but enters into interaction with the surrounding society in *specific limited* ways. In all three countries, Palestinians are to a greater or lesser degree incorporated in the economy. In Jordan, many Palestinians are economically incorporated. While not incorporated in Lebanon's formal economy, Palestinians are an integral part of the country's informal sector. Palestinians are incorporated into the Israeli labour market as a specific segment of that market, although the relationship is one of dependency. Thus, incorporation stands in the middle between assimilation and segregation. It becomes assimilation when the incorporated group in all respects acts as if it was identical to the surrounding society. It becomes segregation when the interaction is reduced to a single or no field of interaction.

A fourth form of adaptation is simply to withdraw from the host-society, the option of *migration*. This may be complete, in that a household leaves, or incomplete, in the form of labour migration of single members.

While we will return to these different forms of adaptation throughout the report, it should be stressed here that the general perspective of adaptation is one where the adaptation is seen as a response to a changing social, economic and political environment, but also something that contributes to the creation of that environment.

² The discussion and perspective is adapted from Eidheim 1971.

Chapter 2

The settings: The communities and their environment

The persistence of the Palestinian refugee-status is most apparent in the existence of more than fifty official UNRWA refugee camps in the Middle East, making the experience of camp-life a reality which nearly one million Palestinians share, a number corresponding to a third of the total registered Palestinian refugees in the Middle East.³ Despite dissimilar territorial settings, Palestinians thus have a common historical experience or reference of camp-residency struggling to cope with an everyday-life continuously influenced by external and internal political events in their respective host countries.

Four official UNRWA- camps, Askar on the West Bank, Baqa'a and Wihdat in Jordan, and Rashidiyya in Lebanon were chosen as settings in this report. In addition, different suburbs in the city of Amman where Palestinians live are also included in order to give a picture of Palestinians living outside camps. These settings constitute the physical framework within which the data in this report was gathered, even though the social networks which involve these settings have a much greater scale. In line with the general case oriented methodology of this study, the settings were chosen not to be particular representative, but rather to be useful in generating contrasts and different life situations.

All names of persons and respondents have been changed in order to maintain personal anonymity.

Rashidiyya

The camp of Rashidiyya lies on the seashore seven kilometres outside the south Lebanese town of Tyre. The 267,000 square metre camp site is surrounded by agricultural areas and citrus plantations providing the camp with a rural setting. The camp is divided between an "old camp" inhabited by the first wave of refugees who came during the early fifties,

³ 1993-UNRWA statistics show that of the total 2,797,179 registered Palestinian refugees, 957,107 live in camps while 1,840,072 live outside camps (Map of UNRWA's Area of Operations, 30 June 1993). The exact numbers are contested, but the general order of magnitude is correct.

and a “new camp” inhabited by refugees who were transferred from the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon in 1964.

Most of the residents in Rashidiyya are 1948-refugees originally from the Galilee region. Rashidiyya is the refugee camp closest to the Israeli border. The refugees can see the hills of their one-time homeland of Palestine across the border, and feel that they are under constant Israeli military surveillance. The sea has at times transported activists and enabled them to carry out attacks on Israeli territory. The camp has therefore frequently been at the centre of warfare, of which the biggest episodes happened in 1973, 1978 and 1982 each time leaving houses in the camp in a total and sem-total demolished state.

The Lebanese army controls the camp's entrance. There were several entrances before 1985, but now both cars and people have to go through the entrance guarded by the Lebanese soldiers.

Until 1987 Rashidiyya housed approximately 21,000 refugees⁴ and was regarded as the largest camp in terms of inhabitants compared to al-Buss and Burj al-Shamali, the other two refugee camps in Tyre. The current number of residents is however by the local camp committee assumed to be reduced to approximately 13,000 inhabitants, mainly due to displacement following the five major destructions of the camp.

The high rate of mobility and displacement of refugees is a direct result of the constant search for personal security throughout the Lebanese Civil War which erupted after the collapse of the country's fragile sectarian political system in 1975 and lasted until 1989.

Individuals and households in Rashidiyya have thus experienced a continuous long term imbalance between their immediate security, consumption and labour needs enforcing them to move in and out of the camp in order to meet these needs.

Former camp residents prefer to continue living in the places where they sought refuge during the civil war, residing either in squatter areas, in forlorn houses, or by relatives in Lebanese towns and villages.⁵ A large number of camp residents have migrated to Western and Arab countries.⁶

⁴ UNRWA-figures show that the number of refugees living in Rashidiyya is 21,543 (Map of UNRWA's Area of Operations, 30 June 1993). Residents themselves say that this was the number of residents before 1987, and that the camp has not housed the original number of residents since the camps war in 1987.

⁵ As a result of the civil war in Lebanon, the Ministry of the Displaced was erected in order to handle the problems of internally displaced people. The Ministry cooperates with UNRWA in order to resettle approximately 6,000 Palestinians households (Sayigh 1994b :20).

⁶ Another factor might be that the UNRWA-registry of camp residents is inflated, not keeping statistically up with the actual number of residents due to the constantly fluctuating residency pattern during the civil war.

A large portion of Rashidiyya residents work as seasonal workers and day-labourers in agricultural fields and citrus plantations. Average male income per day is 9,000-10,000 Lebanese Lira (LL) (5,4 - 6 USD). Females can work two shifts enabling them to earn the same sum as males if they work both shifts. Males are also engaged in the construction industry earning approximately 15,000 LL (9 USD) per day. Underemployment among day-workers is, however, very common, and day-workers complained that they only worked 3-4 days per week.

Perceived unemployment is widespread. Many have income generating labour not related to their profession. Electricians, car mechanics and carpenters are prone to work in the fields as they do not have the means to open up stores neither inside nor outside the camp. Women are able to have an income through canvas-work which they deliver to two organisations. Single women without heavy home-duties are thus able to earn at least 100,000 LL (60 USD) per month provided they work regularly.

UNRWA operates a welfare system which includes three schools and one health centre. In addition, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) operates a hospital. There are disputes concerning responsibilities for electricity- and water systems where UNRWA takes partial responsibility. Special hardship cases⁷ enrolment amount to 11.8% of the registered refugee population in 1992/93 (United Nations 1994:34). According to UNRWA's guidelines, special hardship cases are entitled to rations every second month of basic foodstuffs, cash assistance, access to shelter rehabilitation and self-support project programmes. Before the Lebanese civil war there were restrictions against enlarging dwellings, but these were by-passed during the war, and houses have been rebuilt and enlarged vertically.

Prior to the Lebanese civil war Palestinians enjoyed the benefits of a pluralist society and the freest press in the Arab world. A substantial segment of the native population supported the Palestinian cause. The PLO headquarters were located in Beirut from 1970 until 1982. During this period, the Lebanese authorities withdrew from the camps leaving them as "liberated zones" where the PLO developed into a significant military force in the country (Sayigh 1994a:25).

What started out as an alliance between Lebanese and Palestinian groups was to change character dramatically during the 14-year civil war. The ambivalent attitude between the two communities prevails at present

⁷ UNRWA created the Special Hardship Case- programme in 1978 aimed at providing support to households unable to maintain an economically adequate living standard.

in the south, but does not undermine the fact that there exist mutual bonds between the two groups which are reflected in intermarriage.

Following the Taif Agreement in 1989, Syria's influence and political role in the country became manifest; the presence of Syrian troops was to stabilise internal affairs while Lebanese security and foreign political issues were to comply with Syrian policy.

One of the main effects of the Syrian presence in Lebanon regarding the Palestinians is Syria's support of Palestinian groupings who oppose DoP, enhancing thus the political cleavages within the PLO where Fatah, Arafat's group, is part of the peace process.

In Rashidiyya, the political scene is currently marked by the undisputed leadership of Fatah proponents who display positive attitudes towards DoP, a standpoint which does not necessarily reflect the political attitude of camp residents nor the majority of Palestinians in Lebanon. In fact, PLO leadership at the camp-committee level in south Lebanon can be attributed to the non-existence of Syrian influence south of the Awwali river. The river's borders mark, unofficially, the Syrian and Israeli spheres of influence in south Lebanon where the area of Tyre lies within the latter. The Syrian non-presence has therefore indirectly enabled Fatah to remain in power in Rashidiyya.

Rashidiyya inhabitants indicate that the possibility for them to return back to their homeland is not up for them to negotiate and decide. The decision to migrate to the homeland is mainly in the hands of the international community and politicians, Palestinians and non-Palestinians, who live outside Lebanon. Camp residents have a collective consciousness of being left behind, and this has resulted in a sense of insecurity and apathy concerning their immediate future. Lebanon, previously an important arena for Palestinian affairs, gradually lost political significance since the PLO moved its field of interest from Lebanon to the occupied territories after the PLO-leadership left Lebanon in 1982. This process has been even strengthened following the Oslo-Agreement. Palestinians in Lebanon are aware that the fate of 1948-refugees is not currently on the agenda in the ongoing peace negotiations which build on DoP, while the overall majority of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon belong to this category.

Askar

The camp of Askar lies within the municipal boundaries of the town of Nablus in the West Bank. In 1950 Jordan incorporated⁸ the West Bank and held it under its jurisdiction until the 1967 War when Israel occupied the territory most of which is still kept under Israeli administration. In December 1987, the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation, the intifada, evolved in different parts within the West Bank. In September 1993, the PLO and the Israeli government signed the Declaration of Principles (DoP) which envisaged a future autonomous Palestinian rule in the Occupied Territories.

Before 1948 most camp residents in Askar lived in about 25 towns and villages in the Jaffa and Haifa districts. There are also Bedouins who originate from the Jaffa and Beersheba districts.

When founded in 1950, Askar occupied approximately 119,000 square metres. In 1964 the camp was expanded by another 90,000 square metres (UNRWA - West Bank Field Office, August 1994). The “old” and the “new” Askar camp are regarded as one camp, although they are geographically divided by agricultural fields. The camp is erected on private-owned land.

In 1964 UNRWA had built 1,319 shelters. According to UNRWA's May 1967 figures, the registered refugee population was 5,671 people constituting 994 families (Benvenisti 1986:185). The July 1994 figures show that 10,576 people, constituting 2,324 families, inhabit the camp (UNRWA - West Bank Field Office, August 1994). Since 1964 the camp's boundaries have not changed while the population has grown. The camp therefore suffers from a high population density, but not as high as that of Wihdat.

People lived in tents before UNRWA built mud brick houses which were replaced by cement housing after 1960. During the intifada many people rebuilt their houses and enlarged them to two and three-storey buildings without a permit. In July 1994 UNRWA was rebuilding 30 old houses in Askar camp as part of its Peace Implementation Program (PIP). All housing units are provided with water and electricity from the municipality of Nablus.

In the agricultural area between the old and the new camp, farmers from Azmot grow vegetables. Some plots have been sold to private persons who have erected private houses and apartment buildings. Above the

⁸ As a result of a public conference attended by Palestinian notables which was held in Jericho in 1948, it was decided that the West Bank and the East Bank of the Jordan river were to be linked.

camp there exists a popular living area where new houses were built in the 1980s. An increasing number of camp residents are buying houses in those neighbourhoods.

All UNRWA facilities, except one kindergarten founded by Save the Children, are situated in "old Askar". These facilities include the camp office, a youth centre, a clinic, a women centre and two kindergartens, and four schools covering elementary and preparatory class serving 2,225 pupils (Askar Camp Office, June 1994). The women's centre offers sewing and embroidery programmes, courses in literacy, and lectures in health. UNRWA's services are available for those possessing a refugee card, these being Palestinians registered as UNRWA-refugees. Registered refugees do not have to live in the camp to receive the services. Card-holders living outside the camp are also entitled to camp services offered in the camp.

Local employment opportunities are limited. Inside the camp residents have opened all kinds of shops where electrical articles, food and clothing are sold. There are second hand markets, hair parlours and billiard cafes. Some women work in sewing centres on contracts with Israeli companies. Some men work in car garages located on the main road, others work in local small-scale factories such as soap-fabrication industries. The construction industry and the big vegetable market, where most of the vegetables is brought from the farmers around Nablus, are two sectors which also provide employment. Some camp residents are employed by UNRWA. After the border closure of March 1993 a few workers have been allowed to go back to their work in Israel, where they work in factories, service industries and construction. Other workers try to work in Israel illegally because the salary is higher than in the local market.

Jordan: Wihdat and Baqa'a

In Jordan, there exist thirteen refugee camps, ten which are official UNRWA camps. These were established in the period between 1950 and 1969. Our study focuses on two camps:

Wihdat⁹(also called Amman New Camp) was established in 1955. It is the second biggest camp in Jordan. The camp encompasses an area of 488,000 square metres. The majority of refugees in Wihdat are 1948-refugees who arrived in Jordan before the 1967 War. Wihdat appears to

⁹ *Wihdat* means 'unit' in Arabic.

be more of a quarter of the capital Amman than a camp erected near the city, mainly because the capital city has been enlarged. There are, for example, no clear demarcation lines between the camp and the Ashrafiyya quarter which lies near it.

Originally, the camp accommodated 5,000 refugees who lived in 1,400 UNRWA-constructed shelters. Over the years the camp has grown into an urban-like quarter and is surrounded with areas with high population density. Today, there are 2,660 shelters accommodating the 72,000 persons registered by UNRWA as living in the camp (UNRWA - Jordan Field Office, January 1994). The numbers indicate one of the main frustrations of the living conditions in the camp; lack of space. Each person has approximately 7 square metres of space, and each shelter comprises 27 persons on the average. After the arrival of about 300,000 (Guide to UNRWA, April 1994:6). Palestinians following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Department of Palestinian Affairs which is responsible for the legal implementation of UNRWA directives, disregarded the illegal enlargement of houses and dwellings. Two- and three-storey buildings have therefore been raised in order to accommodate the rising population density in the camp. The overcrowding means that the capacity of the sewage-, garbage-, and the water systems, constructed for the original number of shelter units, are close to breaking down, according to UNRWA officials.

The market place in Wihdat is very popular and one of the busiest centres in the city of Amman. It is important as a trading centre for vegetables, fruits, electrical items and jewellery.

Baq'a is the largest Palestinian refugee camp in the Middle East and houses 78,796 refugees who arrived after the 1967 War (UNRWA - Jordan Field Office, January 1994). It was established in 1968 and lies in a rural area 20 kilometres outside Amman. The camp accommodates both "refugees" (Palestinians who fled in 1948) and "displaced" people (Palestinians who fled following the 1967 War). Approximately 85% of the inhabitants in Baqa'a are second-time refugees, that is refugees who had first escaped after the 1948 war, and thereafter the 1967 war (ibid). The camp's location, half an hour's drive from the capital Amman, and the arable land on which the camp was established, has ensured its inhabitants with diverse modes of employment.

As the case is for Wihdat camp, UNRWA provides camp residents in Baqa'a with different services channelled through 20 installations operated by approximately 600 UNRWA staff members. UNRWA provides education the first 10 years, then children of school-age enrol at government schools for their secondary education. There are 16 schools where

approximately 15,000 children are enrolled (ibid). In addition, there is a clinic and social services are rendered to the most needy.

Jordan: Amman

The Jordanian capital Amman is characterised by rapid growth since the first wave of Palestinian refugees in 1948. In 1943 the population of Amman was only 30,000 (Aruri 1972:34). In 1991 1,3 million inhabitants resided in the capital (Jordan, Statistical Yearbook 1992:19)

The suburbs outside the down-town area are spread over numerous hillsides within a diameter of around 20 kilometres and are surrounded by farmed land.

The dominating economic activity for the labour force is in the service and administrative sectors. Most of Jordan's manufacturing industry, which has been recently developed, is concentrated in and around Amman, following the loss of Nablus as industrial centre in 1967. The factories produce mainly food products, clothing or consumer goods, while the heavier industries are phosphate extraction, cement manufacture and petroleum refining. In addition to its position as a centre of trade, commerce and finance, Amman is an important connection point with highways to Aqaba, Baghdad and Damascus.

One part of the new urban population are East Bank natives who have given up their traditional bedouin life. Most of the urbanisation process, however, is due to the arrival of Palestinian refugees, most of whom choose to settle in the capital or its surroundings. There are no statistics available showing the percentage of Palestinian residents in the different suburbs, though some areas clearly dominated by Palestinians can be distinguished from mixed areas. The north-west part of the city is dominated by the middle and upper economic strata, while the southern suburbs are mostly populated by the lower-class strata.

We can distinguish between three types of urban areas in Amman where Palestinians live. First, there are large areas outside the camps, inhabited by refugees who have had the ability to move out. Part of our fieldwork was conducted in one such area called Jabal Nasr. These "extended camps" are dominated by lower class Palestinians, and the border between the camp territory and the surroundings is not always marked, even though the streets are usually wider, and the houses higher outside than inside the border. In terms of physical adaptation, then, Palestinian households in Jabal Nasr are more or less assimilated into their surroundings.

Second, there are islands of more or less pure Palestinian communities in Amman, where refugees from the same hometown or with a common background have settled together. One such area is a part of the al-Taybeh suburb, where nearly all the inhabitants are originally from the Palestinian village of Dora. Another example is Umm Nuwwara, which is a new suburb inhabited mostly by Palestinians who were obliged to leave Kuwait after the Gulf crisis in 1990. Both suburbs of al-Taybeh and Umm Nuwwara are examples of physical adaptation where Palestinians have formed more or less segregated neighbourhoods in the Jordanian capital.

Finally, there are mixed areas, where Palestinians and Jordanians live together. One example is the upper class region called Jabal Amman where Palestinian housing units are assimilated, i.e. not physically separable, from the housing units of their Jordanian neighbours who belong to the same upper social class as the Palestinians.

Most Palestinians who came with the big waves of refugees in 1948 and 1967 had no choice but to stay in camps, at least for a while. Only the most prosperous people had the resources to settle outside camps. But many Palestinians from the West Bank established relations with the East Bank during the 1950s and 1960s. They went there to study or work, and had therefore already established a home when the 1967 War made it impossible for them to return to their families on the other side of the Jordan river. This group of displaced persons have thus not been obliged to move into camps as a result of an external crisis.

Social networks are naturally dependent on the type of neighbourhood. In Palestinian dominated areas, like outside some of the camps and in Palestinian “island suburbs”, the social contact with Jordanians is limited. Inter-marriage is rare, and it is not unusual to hear that a father would not accept a Jordanian husband for his daughter. This could be explained by the high percentage of marriage between relatives; many say that the husband should ideally be from the same *hamula* (patrilineal descent group).

In more mixed suburbs, many stress that “there is no difference between us and the Jordanians”. However, students are usually able to tell how many Jordanians and how many Palestinians there are in the class.

Differences and similarities

Apparently, there are several differences and similarities between the geographical settings where the fieldworks were conducted.

If we look at the similarities, one notices first, the remarkable structural resemblance of UNRWA's welfare system in all four camps with the establishment of schools, health clinics and social welfare institutions. In addition, we find that the same regulations such as the eligibility to a "refugee" - or a "Special Hardship Case" status according to UNRWA requirements are in effect in all four camps. Camp residents, thus, acknowledge UNRWA's presence as their welfare state in exile.

Secondly, the native language of Palestinians is Arabic, a language which they share with the native inhabitants in the host-societies where refugees settled in. Although the Palestinian dialect could be recognised, this did not cause any difficulties in the communication and interaction between the refugee and the native community. In this regard the Palestinian case differs substantially from other refugee situations where the refugee and host communities do not share the same language. Accordingly, Palestinians are to a much greater extent than many refugees in other parts of the world intrinsically able to participate in the economic life of their host countries.

Thirdly, population density inside the camps is an apparent similarity which several camps in our report share. The erection of multi-storey buildings and the enlargement of dwellings in order to accommodate new households (such as children's households upon marriage), have resulted in overcrowding and caused a pressure on the existing infrastructural units such as sewage-, electricity- and water systems.

Fourth, most camp residents belong to the lower or lower-middle social economic stratas in their respective host-countries. One of the main reasons for remaining in the camp is that the cost of housing, either renting or building a dwelling, is considerably cheaper inside than outside camps.

As regards *differences* between the settings an important variable is the pattern of economic activities. Although Palestinians in all host countries participate in a wide range of economic activities as will be further elaborated in chapter six, refugee camp dwellers appear to be more involved in irregular work, day-labour and employment in the informal sector than what is case of Palestinians living outside camps.

Secondly, the political framework within which Palestinians are part of in each country differ widely. In Lebanon, the civil war has directly influenced the living conditions of Palestinians who are still affected by

its aftermath. The occupation in the West Bank, and since 1987 the intifada, have to a greater or lesser degree confined the freedom of mobility and economic activity of West Bankers. In Jordan, Palestinians enjoy full citizen rights and have thereby a more secure civil status than in the other settings.

Thirdly, regarding forms of adaptation defined in the introduction, the camp of Rashidiyya can be considered as a setting closer to the segregated end of the continuum as the boundaries of the camp are delineated sharply both physically and socially. This is to a slightly lesser extent also true of Baqa'a. The urban neighbourhoods in Amman lean toward the assimilated extreme, while Wihdat and Askar represent camps which are more incorporated into their host communities.

Chapter 3

The formal relations to the states: Givens and strategies

Palestinian refugees residing in different states¹⁰ are subject to several laws and regulations that establish their legal status, rights and obligations. The different laws and regulations that engulf Palestinian refugees form a structural framework within which Palestinian refugees have to conform. These legal frameworks have to a great extent affected the daily-lives of individuals and households, and influenced the multitude of coping-strategies available to Palestinians in their struggle to survive as refugees living under the jurisdiction of different states.

A multifaceted legal category

Different historical upheavals since 1948 have complicated the determination of legal statuses provided to Palestinian refugees, both by UNRWA and by the respective states.

The legal status refugees received in the different states is to a great extent determined by UNRWA's criteria for the definition of "Palestine refugees" which plays a role in determining the personal legal status a Palestinian receives in their countries of residence. Another factor which further complicates the formal relation between Palestinian refugees and the host-state, is the conglomerate of legal statuses the refugees received according to their time of arrival to the host-country. Different historical upheavals such as the 1948-exodus, the 1967-Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and the 1990-Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, created waves of refugees where each group was accorded with disparate legal statuses. Palestinian refugees are thus a multifaceted legal group, not only in terms of the variety of laws they are subjugated to in the different host countries, but also in terms of the heterogeneous legal identities they received due to differences in dates of arrival and places of origin.

¹⁰ The West Bank is occupied by Israel. Palestinians residing in the West Bank are thus under Israeli military jurisdiction. Israel is therefore here understood as the state which issues decrees and military orders to which Palestinians living in the West Bank have to conform.

In sum, there are three main factors that determine the legal status of Palestinian refugees:

- a) the historical period in which they fled;
- b) the set of official state-laws and regulations that deal with
- c) the Palestinian presence in each state; and
- d) UNRWA's definition of "Palestine refugees".

These factors are partly interrelated, as the case is with Palestinians who fled in 1948, most of whom met UNRWA's criteria for what the Agency termed as "Palestine refugees" which refers to the following category:

... persons whose normal residence was Palestine during the period of 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict and took refuge in one of the countries or areas where UNRWA provides relief, and their direct descendants through the male line. (UNRWA's Consolidated Eligibility Instructions).

Refugees who met these criteria were registered and regarded as legitimate refugees by the states they resided in. For different reasons many Palestinian refugees failed to meet these criteria in the 1950s. Among the groups that were excluded are those taken off UNRWA's register on obtaining employment; those who lost their land but not their livelihood in 1948; those who left historical Palestine before 1948 including those deported after the 1936-Arab Revolt; those who left during the Second World War to work for the British elsewhere in Palestine; those who missed the dead-line to register; those who were not in economic need for receiving UNRWA-services; and those who refused to register due to political principle.

Palestinians who became refugees for the first time following the 1967-war are thus not registered by UNRWA. Although the Agency addresses them as Palestine refugees, they are formally referred to as "displaced persons". In addition, refugees formally categorised as 1967-refugees by UNRWA are not necessarily refugees who fled as a direct result of the 1967 War. The 1967-refugee figure also includes refugees who were not able to register as 1948-refugees, as well as Palestinians who actually left the West Bank before 1967. The latter category includes Palestinians who were studying or working outside the West Bank, in Jordan's East Bank for instance, at the time of the war and who were not able to resettle there when the war was over. The term "displaced persons" which Jordan uses for categorising 1967-refugees therefore reflects the Jordanian government's perception of West Bankers as displaced Jordanians since

these Palestinians had Jordanian citizenships following Jordan's incorporation of the West Bank in 1950.

The 1967- refugees are administratively referred to as "N.R." (non-registered) by UNRWA, denoting that they are not registered as 1948-refugees who are eligible to UNRWA-services. 1967-refugees residing in Jordan do, however, receive UNRWA-rations and services that are subject to reimbursement by the Jordanian government, while 1967-refugees in Lebanon do not have access to UNRWA-services.

Palestinians who fled from Gaza to Jordan in 1967 number approximately 38,000 refugees (Guide to UNRWA, April 1994:10). Gazans do not have the same rights and obligations as their West Bank compatriots because they were under Egyptian administration before Israel's occupation in 1967.

The Gazans in Jordan, 1967-refugees in Lebanon, along with the unknown numbers of non-registered Palestinian refugees form categories of refugees who are either economically or legally in a vulnerable position; economically vulnerable because they do not have access to UNRWA's welfare services, legally vulnerable because they face a number of regulations whereof the most precarious is their security of residence in the state.

The relationship between state and refugee

Each of the four states, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel, have accorded its Palestinian refugee-community with diverging sets of rights and duties vis-à-vis the state. Residence in different states has thus had crucial implications for the material and physical well-being of Palestinians because each state's legal framework directly affects the personal security, economic opportunities and social situation of refugees. These different state policies have created a range of Palestinian identities in terms of legal statuses. Each state has formed administrative authorities which deal with the presence of Palestinian refugees, some of which are sub-units under either the Foreign or the Interior Ministries of the respective host-states.

In *Jordan*, refugee camps are provided by the Jordanian government. All camps are administered by the *Department of Palestinian Affairs* which is an independent department linked to the Prime Minister's Office. The Jordanian Government is responsible for the administration, security and services in the camps. UNRWA offers education, health and social welfare services which are subject to reimbursement from the Jordanian Government.

There has been three main waves of Palestinian mass influx to Jordan. The first wave of approximately 440,000 refugees is the largest group.¹¹ They are referred to as the “1948-refugees”, denoting Palestinians who left their homeland following the 1948-war. Most of the 72,000 residents in the camp of Wihdat, for instance, are 1948-refugees (UNRWA- Jordan Field Office, January 1994).

A second wave of refugees was created following the 1967 war when an additional 240,000 Palestinians settled in the East Bank (Guide to UNRWA, April 1994:6). This wave included both resident West Bank Palestinians, Palestinians from Gaza, and 1948-refugees who had previously fled following the creation of the state of Israel. While 1948-refugees retained their legal status as “Palestine refugees” according to UNRWA's criterias, the new influx of 1967-refugees (who had not fled in 1948) were to be formally referred to as “displaced persons” both by UNRWA and the Jordanian state. Of the approximately 400,000 refugees who fled to Jordan in 1967, 240,000 were first time refugees, while the rest were 1948-refugees. The camp of Baqa'a which houses approximately 79,000 refugees includes both categories of refugees whereof 85% are registered as 1948-refugees and the remaining 15% are displaced persons (UNRWA- Jordan Field Office, January 1994). The 1990-Iraqi invasion of Kuwait created the third wave of Palestinian refugees where approximately 300,000 Palestinians came from Kuwait and the other Gulf states (Guide to UNRWA, Aril 1994:6). In addition there is a considerable number of Palestinians who came in between periods of war but were later barred from returning.

The bulk of Palestinian refugees residing in Jordan are eligible to Jordanian citizenships which accords them the same civic rights as native East Bank Jordanians. Having a Jordanian citizenship legally grants Palestinian refugees the right to move, work, own property, and vote as native Jordanians. Despite an acquired Jordanian citizenship, 1948-refugees do not lose their UNRWA-defined status as Palestinian refugees.

When Jordan relinquished its full claims to sovereignty over the West Bank in 1989, West Bank Palestinians lost their granted right to Jordanian citizenship. The government, however, still issues so-called “two-year passports” which differ in legal treatment from “five-year”-passports accorded to other Jordanians.

¹¹ The precise number of Palestinian refugees who settled in the West and East Bank following the 1948 war is unknown. The number 440,000 is based on estimates provided by Brand 1988. She estimates the West Bank refugee population to amount to 280, 000 registered refugees (ibid:), and another 160,000 refugees who did not qualify for UNRWA assistance (ibid:148).

Most Palestinians living in Jordan have, in terms of formal legal relationship to the state, the opportunity to obtain a more secure personal legal position through their citizenships, than Palestinians living in other states, most of whom do not have the right to citizenship. Syria, notably, comes nearest Jordan in granting Palestinians equal civil rights as Syrian citizens, excluding citizenship and the right to vote. Gaza-refugees do not, however, enjoy citizenship rights. They are obliged to apply for residence and work permits as other foreigners, they travel on Egyptian travel documents and must obtain a return visa before departing from Jordan if they wish to enter the country again. Some Gazans have “two-year” Jordanian passports due to personal causes such as marriage with Jordanian citizens.

The formal legal status for Palestinians is becoming more complicated after Palestinians lost the right to obtain Jordanian citizenships in 1989. In addition, the fact that Palestinians often move and work all over the Middle East, may also create problems for their legal status, as the following example show:

A 19-year-old Palestinian student who works as a waiter has no passport. He was born in Kuwait where his father, born in Jaffa and raised in the West bank, had migrated to in 1963. His father, who possessed a Jordanian citizenship, had recently died, and his mother is not entitled to a citizenship because she is from Gaza, leaving the young student without formal travel documents.

Although formally Jordanian, there exists a social cleavage between native Palestinians (West Bankers) and native Jordanians (East Bankers) which was clearly brought to surface upon the outbreak of the Black September internal clashes of 1970 between the two groups. Since 1970, Palestinian political activity has been a sensitive subject. What was built up of Jordanian-Palestinian integration created suspicion which still colours the attitudes of many people.

Several respondents in our fieldwork indicated that they perceived themselves as being discriminated against in Jordanian society. In the sphere of education, for instance, the daughter of a surgeon complained that she was not able to enter the University of Jordan because it operates with a system of geographical quotas. As she belongs to the very small quota of “Jordanians Abroad”, which according to her, constitute 6% of the students accepted and where Palestinians are heavily represented, she was not accepted while Jordanians with lower marks were enrolled. According to her father, the system is discriminating as it makes it more difficult for Palestinians from the cities where most of them live to get

enrolled than for citizens in the rural districts who are predominantly native Jordanians.

What is noteworthy in our context is that Palestinian identity appears to be closely connected with the degree of political activism in Jordan, whether activity spans from demonstrations to ideological conviction. Equal treatment before the law among East and West Bankers in society is perceived by Palestinians (West Bankers) to be insufficient when it comes to bolster and emphasise their identity as Palestinians. As long as Palestinian activism is perceived as threatening by the host state, Palestinians are bound to perceive that their persecution and alleged discrimination is closely linked with their identity as Palestinians.

In *Lebanon*, the *Directorate General of Palestinian Refugee Affairs (DPRA)* within the Ministry of Interior is responsible for the Palestinian presence in the country where approximately 350,000 Palestinians reside. The exact number of Palestinians, however, is unknown because the figure includes a certain number of Lebanese and excludes a number of Palestinians. These are the descendants of some 160,000 refugees who arrived in 1948 and an additional 5,000 who arrived in the aftermath of 1967-war with Israel and the 1970-Black September clashes in Jordan. UNRWA-data indicate that 334,659 Palestinians are UNRWA-registered (*Guide to UNRWA*, April 1994:7). The rest is either registered at the DPRA or are residing illegally in the country.

Palestinians are assumed to constitute approximately 8-10% of the Lebanese population¹². They are perceived by the government as a heavy political burden on the already fragile sectarian political system which collapsed during the 14-year long civil war. Prior to and during the civil war, the Palestinian cause was endorsed by several Moslem and leftist political groupings to the disagreement of the Christian political elite. A clear policy regulating the rights and duties of Palestinian refugees in the country has been more or less absent. Palestinians did not have official statements regulating their presence in the country before the Cairo Accords were concluded in November 1969 whereby Lebanese-PLO relations were settled.¹³ The Accords were unilaterally abrogated by the Lebanese government in June 1987, leaving the Palestinian refugee community in Lebanon in a politically uncertain situation. The official

¹²The exact number of Lebanese who live in Lebanon is unknown. According to official 1971-estimates the Lebanese population includes 2,13 million inhabitants, excluding the Palestinian population. UN mid-year population data from 1991 estimates the Lebanese population at 2,75 million (*The Middle East & North Africa* 1994:626)

¹³ The Cairo Accords are also known as the 'Cairo Agreement'. The Accords were never published or ratified by the Lebanese National Assembly (Sayigh 1994a:33).

ambiguity regarding the Palestinian presence is clearly reflected in the handling of the legal residence of refugees in the country.

The Lebanese authorities have issued four decrees relating to the Palestinian presence in Lebanon; one which established the DPRA, another determined its powers, the third installed a special Lebanese security force for the Palestinian camps, while the fourth authorised the establishment of a camp (Alnatour 1993:42).¹⁴ Neither the Cairo Accords nor these decrees address the relationship between the refugees and their host country within a legal framework clarifying individual rights and obligations.

As a collective body, Palestinians are accorded residency rights in Lebanon within the context of decree no. 319 of August 2, 1962 where Palestinians are specified as “(f)oreigners not holding documents from their original countries and residing in Lebanon”. This article urged Palestinians to settle their status and obtain temporary or permanent residential permits (Alnatour 1993:42). After 1975, however, the granting of identity cards and travel documents was made conditional on the presentation of UNRWA ration cards. Refugees not registered at UNRWA, including the 1967-refugees, are estimated to encompass 50,000 refugees.¹⁵ Other estimates state the number of unregistered (illegal and those carrying residency permits) at around 100,000 persons.

The 14-year long Lebanese civil war partly explains the uncertainty regarding the exact number of Palestinians in the country where unknown numbers had their residency permits confiscated or stamped “not allowed to return” in the early 1980s. The Lebanese authorities also took off the register Palestinians entitled to stay in Lebanon if they acquired residency or other citizenship abroad.

The conditional connection made by the Ministry of Interior between residency permits and UNRWA cards jeopardizes the security of residence of all Palestinians not registered by UNRWA, and enhances the legal vulnerability of unregistered refugees in Lebanon. The danger of the conditional connection between residency and the UNRWA card has come to surface in 1993, when the Agency issued new computerised ID-cards and set a one-year deadline for the registered to meet personally. Since large numbers of legally registered are outside the country for

¹⁴ Suheil Alnatour is a Palestinian from Lebanon. He is trained as a lawyer and has done extensive research on the refugee situation, particularly the civil and legal rights of Palestinians in Lebanon. Alnatour is a writer and journalist. He is Director of the office of the monthly Arab *Le Monde Diplomatique* in Beirut.

¹⁵ World Refugee Survey, U.S. Committee for refugees, 1993:108.

motives of work, study and residency, this practice might lead to the annulment of the residency permits for an unknown number of Palestinian refugees, who thus are denied the right to come back and stay in Lebanon, their original country of residence (Alnatour 1993:42). Following these rules, approximately 25% of all Palestinians residing in Lebanon currently face severe restrictions on their residence security.

During our fieldwork, we encountered several examples of households that have had difficulties in issuing entry-visas for family-members who had migrated during the civil war.

Umm Dib in the camp of Rashidiyya in Lebanon tells that as a result of Israel's establishment of the security zone in the south of Lebanon, she has no problems visiting her brothers in Israel where she has been four times after she fled in 1948. She and her son Sari, however, had to work for one month in order to get an entry visa for her son Dib, who was born and raised in Lebanon, when he wished to visit his family last year. He currently lives and works in Germany where he has been staying the past ten years. What complicated Dib's application was that his Palestinian passport, issued by the DPRA, had expired, and the officials were suspicious of his intentions to come back. "Sari and me had to go to an attorney (kateb 'adl), and then appeal to the court (mahkama) in order to issue an entry permit which enabled Ziad to visit us for a month", recalls Umm Dib.

Refugees face formal labour restrictions since they rarely obtain work permits; the number of permits given to Palestinians since 1948 do not exceed 2,500 permits (Alnatour 1993:43). As a result, Lebanese labour laws have pressed Palestinian labour into the "informal sector". Furthermore, Palestinians are barred from working in government and foreign companies and institutions, and can only practice as doctors, lawyers, engineers and other "free professions" by joining syndicates, conditional on Lebanese nationality (Sayigh 1994a: 24).

Palestinians recall stories whereby members of their families were killed on check-points during the civil war because they produced Palestinian ID-cards. Some Palestinians who were dependent on finding work in other places than their places of residence bought forged Lebanese ID-cards during the civil war in order to enhance their personal security when they moved around. Mazen from the camp of Rashidiyya recalls that his father, a day-labourer who used to seek work on construction sites, issued a forged ID card in 1982 at the price of 100 Lira. He had to go to Beirut to find work at a time when Palestinians were not allowed to enter the city.

The sectarian system in Lebanon has, on the other hand, alleviated the security and living condition of Christian Palestinians since most of them obtained Lebanese citizenships, a step which strengthened the Christian character of the state and empowered the country's Christian political elite. Middle-class Moslem Palestinians were also able to obtain citizenships through *wasta* until the mid-sixties. The Christian Palestinians, are however, a small minority of the Palestinians, and the vast majority of Moslem Palestinians did not get the same access to Lebanese nationality and have been dependent upon the issuing and re-issuing of vital documents to legitimate their existence in their country of residence.

Having a Lebanese citizenship grants Palestinians a range of rights of which the most important is the right to stay in their country of residence. A citizenship thus eliminates the danger of insecure residency in Lebanon. It also provides a person with certain rights that guards him or her from arbitrary legal treatment before the law, and strengthens a person's security of physical mobility in the country of residence. A citizenship also entails a range of social and economic advantages such as the right to enter public secondary schools, lower tax-fees for the purchase of property, and the non-dependency on work-permits. A citizenship may also be regarded as one of the strongest indicators and bases for assimilation or incorporation in a country, and can be instrumental in diminishing the formal legal unequal treatment between citizens and non-citizens in a country.

During our fieldwork, the issue of granting citizenship to some groups of Palestinian refugees was widely debated in the Lebanese media. Although the vast majority of Palestinians residing in Lebanon are not affected, some are. An unknown number currently registered as refugees are, according to the new citizenship directives issued in June 1993, eligible to a Lebanese citizenship. These directives affect two categories of Palestinians; a) inhabitants of the so-called "Seven Villages" which are situated on the southern Lebanese boarder currently under Israeli control, and b) the offspring of Lebanese women married to Palestinians.

The predominantly Shiite inhabitants of the "Seven Villages" have since Lebanon's independence in 1943 been regarded as "inhabitants under probe", not eligible to a citizenship, a state policy which aimed at preserving the sectarian balance within the Lebanese population. Palestinians who come from, or have fled from these villages are now able to get a Lebanese citizenship. Likewise, the offspring of Lebanese women married to Palestinians are now able to apply for Lebanese citizenships. Previously, citizenship was granted to offspring in mix-marriages only if the father was Lebanese.

The granting of Lebanese citizenship to some Palestinians can be considered a strong incorporating factor in Lebanese society which may influence future decisions of those affected concerning migration to a Palestinian homeland. Salah Salah, member of the PLO's Local Council in Lebanon (*al-majlis al-markazi*), and leader of the "Returnees Committee" (*lajnat al-'aidin*) has criticised the policy of granting Palestinians a Lebanese citizenship "in order to solve the problem of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon" (*al-Wasat*, July 18, 1994:60). According to him, this issue should be postponed to the beginning of the third year of the "Oslo-Agreement"; Palestinians should be granted civil rights as in Jordan and Syria, but not the right to citizenship, retaining thereby their refugee status (*ibid*:61).

The case of the children of Sana, a Lebanese Shiite married to a Palestinian in Rashidiyya, illustrates some aspects of the complex issue of citizenship and national identity which comes to surface when Palestinians have the opportunity to apply for Lebanese citizenship:

Sana (b. 1950) carries a Lebanese and a Palestinian ID-card after marrying a Palestinian. She has been head of household since her husband Mohammed, who worked as a taxi driver, was killed in 1984 by an unknown militia while Israel controlled the area of Tyre. She has 6 children between the age of 21 and 11, her eldest son Rami was 11 when she became a widow. She is financially supported by a Palestinian organisation which sponsors widows, and an Islamic Gulf charity organisation. In addition, her Palestinian father-in-law has been generous with her and his grandchildren. In 1993 he bought the land on which Sana's house is erected for the sum of 1 million Lira (approximately 600 USD in 1994-currency). She applied for UNRWA-help in order to enlarge or rebuild the original two-room zinko roofed dwelling but did not get a positive answer. Her father-in-law therefore stepped in and helped her financially in building the new two-room dwelling beside the old UNRWA-dwelling. "He is generous with his grandchildren, although he himself has been a day-labourer in the fields all his life. Now that all his children have their own houses, he has extra money for us".

Her husband's kin are keen at knowing whether Sana will apply for Lebanese citizenships for the children following the new regulations that grant the descendants of Lebanese mothers citizenships regardless of their father's nationality. She had assured them that she would follow her husband's kin: wherever they moved, she would move; she would not go anywhere without them. "Besides, the citizenship cost too much, up to 1 million Lira (600 USD) per

person, I cannot afford this sum for each of my children!"¹⁶ Sana stresses that she feels Palestinian because she has suffered like the rest of the camp under the atrocities of the Amal-militia, and because her children consider themselves to be Palestinian. She is indebted to her husband's family who has helped her in building her current home and has strong incentives of following her husband's family although she has the right to stay in Lebanon.

Clearly, Sana and her children have gained new formal legal rights in Lebanon which may ease and bolster her own and her children's future formal right of residence in the country following the new citizenship regulations. At the same time she is well-integrated as a member in her husband's Palestinian family. It is her husband's extended family which offer the most important and significant financial resources, and not her Lebanese family. Although she has lived in a Lebanese village before marrying her Palestinian husband, she prefers living in the camp beside her husband's kin. Sana capitalises on her physical closeness to them. She knows they can step in, both financially and socially, whenever she is in need. Her eldest two children have both got jobs through friends of her husband's kin; Rami is part of a working-group together with other Palestinian day-labourers and has a good relationship with his foreman who provides regular work and thereby grants Rami a regular income. Sana's other son works as an apprentice at the shop of a Palestinian electrician who knew his father.

At the same time, it might prove profitable to apply for citizenships in the future if Sana or her children are prevented from achieving certain objectives, whether financial or related to security matters. She might conclude that applying for a citizenship might increase her assets in the long-run without necessarily impairing her position among her in-laws, and thus losing the benefits of living among them.

Another Palestinian living in Lebanon is Abu Fadi whose legal status is a registered 1948-refugee. He comes from one of the Seven Villages, entitling him and his family to apply for Lebanese citizenships. "A disgrace to our identity", comments Abu Fadi, "I would not allow it. Those who do it are poor Palestinians who think that the Lebanese government will help them with something. They are traitors." He insists on calling the new regulations as a "plot of nationalisation", and is ardently against

¹⁶At the time (July 1994), the debate in the parliament was still going on concerning the fees for the Lebanese citizenship. While some representatives suggested that the fee be 1 million Lira (600 USD/4200 NOK), others suggested that it should be only 25,000 (15 USD/105 NOK) arguing that a citizenship is not bought but granted. The Government proposed a fee of 50,000 Lira for persons over the age of 18, and 25,000 Lira for those under (*Assafir*, July 20, 1994).

granting Palestinians living in Lebanon the right to a Lebanese nationality. Abu Fadi has seemingly strong political reasons for not applying for a Lebanese citizenship. He has been a PLO-fighter all his life, and has a military rank although he currently has a civil job as leader of the popular committee in a squatter area. He is more eager to see what the peace process might result in. He believes he might get a job in a Palestinian homeland. "My rifle has been my identity for so long. Let's see what Holst's identity might bring us", he says, referring to the late Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The *West Bank* is inhabited by 1,2 million¹⁷ Palestinians, of whom 39% are registered refugees. Palestinians in the West Bank were under Jordanian rule between 1948 and 1967 following Jordan's annexation in 1950. Since 1967 the West Bank has been occupied by Israel along with the Gaza strip. Since the signing of the DoP in September 1993, negotiations have been under way between Israel and the PLO concerning the establishment of autonomous rule under Palestinian leadership. In August 1994, the administration of schools was transferred to Palestinian bodies. Negotiations are still ongoing regarding the further implementation of Declaration of Principles.

In the following some formal regulations and laws concerning the legal rights, obligations and obstacles which Palestinians have been subjugated to since 1967 are outlined. The elaboration is meant to illustrate the legal conditions which have formed the framework of the Palestinian sphere of action and the resulting coping strategies in the West Bank during the past 25 years.

The legal basis for the operation of the administrative and judicial systems in the West Bank under Israeli occupation is a proclamation issued on June 7, 1967 which declares that the commander of the *Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)* on the West Bank assumed "any power of government, legislation, appointive or administrative" (Benvenisti 1986:143). The administration of the West Bank is thus under the control of the *Military Government (MG)* which is directly responsible to the Minister of Defence. The MG carries out both security and civilian tasks. Although the *Civilian Administration (CA)* was established in 1981, civilian matters remained completely subordinate to the MG (ibid:145).

¹⁷ The figure is based on the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) which estimates that the *de facto* population, i.e. the population present at the time of the census excluding those who are outside the territory for whatever reason, of the West Bank is 1,052,000 (World Bank, September 1993:5 and CBS 1993:758). In addition, the non-Jewish population of Jerusalem which is estimated at 155,500 is included (CBS 1993:74).

The rule in the West Bank has been a rule by decrees where *Security Enactments* and *Military Orders* covered all aspects of daily life.¹⁸ Until 1986 there has been approximately 15,000 orders and amendments issued covering the spheres of agriculture, commerce, education, health, censorship, security, land, public order, traffic and taxes (Benvenisti 1986:196). West Bankers were controlled through the Israeli issuing of ID-cards, travel permits, work-permits, driving licences, and licences for professional practices (Heiberg & Øvensen 1993:27). The issuing of “red” and “green” ID-cards by the Israelis, whereby previously detained persons receive green ID-cards while non-detained persons have red ID-cards illustrates how Palestinians were formally differentiated under military rule. All Palestinians have to apply for permits to cross the border into Israel. Those holding green ID-cards are easily sealed out and are not granted an entry-permit, and even a red-card does not guarantee a seeker to obtain an entry-permit. Applicants under 25 years did not generally obtain entry-permits into Israel. Many, however, enter Israel illegally when the borders are closed because more job-opportunities are available in Israel than in the West Bank. Israeli authorities control the border and thereby the labour-migration between the West Bank and Israel, and decide the number of entries granted. On 4 April 1993, for instance, Israeli authorities allowed the entrance of 1,200 Palestinians into Israel to perform emergency farm work despite a border closure. A week later, an additional 7,000 Palestinians were allowed into Israel (Middle East Journal, Summer 1993). The Israeli Labour Ministry has thus direct influence on the number of Palestinians that are allowed to enter the Israeli labour market at any time.

West Bankers have been exposed to detainment without trial because the military commander has the authority to detain a person perceived as a security threat without bringing him to trial, on the grounds that trial would endanger the “security of the region”. A detention order could be issued for a six-month period and may be renewed indefinitely. Until 1987, the total number of administrative detainees reached approximately 20,000 (Pelleg 1993:51).

In a household in Askar, four out of five sons were detained and received green ID-cards during the intifada following participation in demonstrations and the throwing of stones. Jamil (b. 1971) was detained and imprisoned four times: three months 1987, one

¹⁸ Jordanian laws regulating personal legal affairs, some of which are based on Islamic codes of law (shari'a), continued to be in effect following the Israeli occupation in 1967.

month 1988, 15 days in 1989 and for a whole year in 1990. In 1988 he was shot in the stomach.. His brothers Ziad (b. 1965) was detained for two months, and had a green ID-card throughout the intifada, just as the third brother, Hussein (b. 1968). Hussein entered Israel illegally in search of work and got a job through a friend, but was arrested soon after he started working. He received a 200 JD fine and stayed for a month in jail. After going out of jail, he went back working in Israel on a construction site. The fourth brother, Nizar (b. 1972) was detained six months in 1988 and another six months in 1989. He also carried a green ID-card throughout the intifada. Following the Madrid Conference in October 1991, all four brothers regained their red ID- cards.

Constraints against personal security in the camp have prevented many Palestinians from a regular school-career or participation in the labour market.

Despite military rule, the occupation has opened up for a labour market which offers higher wages than those Palestinians are able to receive in their own labour-market.

Jamal is a refugee from the camp of Askar. He works on a construction site in Israel. Jamal told his colleague that he would like to marry a Palestinian girl living in Israel, that is a Palestinian with Israeli citizenship who has a formal status as an Israeli Arab. His colleague who himself is an Israeli citizen, introduced the idea of Jamal marrying his niece. The couple is now engaged. Jamal admits that marriage with a non-refugee Palestinian girl with Israeli nationality is very costly. One reason is that her family requires a higher standard of living than refugee girls raised up in the camps demand, a desire which entails large bride-wealth transaction; The Arab Israeli girl's family require 3,000 JD (4,800 USD) instead of the regular 1,500 JD (2,400 USD) as a transaction for the girl's marriage. Jamal's family backs him up financially. Jamal explains that his family thinks of the future. It is a good investment for a refugee family to marry into a non-refugee family of Arab-Israeli background, a step which would eventually grant the refugee-financee an Israeli ID-card. The refugee family concludes that the household as a collective increases its assets as a result of marriage with a non-refugee. It is useful to have a member who has an Israeli ID-card since regular labour and income in Israel is thus granted.

UNRWA's definition of registered Palestine refugees

The formal status-variance of 1948- and 1967-refugees which UNRWA uses differentiates between registered refugees who meet the Agency's definition of Palestine refugees such as the 1948-refugees, and the "displaced persons" of 1967 who are recognised as refugees but are regarded as "unregistered" since they do not meet the working definition rendered on page 24.

The legal importance which the UNRWA-status has achieved for unregistered Palestinian refugees, notably in Lebanon, has been mentioned earlier. Equally important as the legal status which an UNRWA-registration secures, is the economic significance of the UNRWA-status for the well-being of Palestinians. Being or not being a "card-holder", that is possessing an UNRWA registration card, has financial and social repercussions for the living condition of refugees in camps.

A "card-holder" is entitled to a range of social and financial services which non-card-holders do not have access to, although both groups may reside in the refugee camp. Unregistered refugees are not entitled to education, nor can they enlist on the vocational-training courses, and they do not have access to UNRWA's social programmes. These structural disadvantages compel some refugees to achieve certain services, such as primary education at UNRWA-schools, in different ways, mainly by using *wasta*; either paying bribes or contacting persons who can enrol the descendants of "unregistered" refugees as if they were "registered" in return for other types of material or non-material favours.

In other circumstances, UNRWA card-holders seek to maintain an achieved status, such as being classified as a "Special Hardship Case" (SHC) because this status alleviates some of their financial needs. An SHC client is entitled to bi-monthly food-rations which consist of basic foodstuffs (among these are 10 kilos of wheat per person, sugar, cans of corn beef and sardines, oil, and burgul). Approximately 10% of camp residents in the camp of Rashidiyya are SHC-cases consisting of individuals and households in special need: widows with children under the age of 18, head of family over the age of 60 years; families headed by orphans under 18 years of age; head of household who is disabled or mentally handicapped; families where heads of household has been detained for a period exceeding three months; head of family or sole male adult (over 18 years of age) who is following a full-time course of study at a recognised educational establishment (UNRWA, Relief Services Instruction No. 1/94 (Provisional), Special Hardship Assistance, January 1994:2).

Sana, who resides in the camp of Rashidiyya, is classified as an SHC by UNRWA, entitling her to receive basic foodstuffs every second month because she is a widow taking care of children *under the age of 18*. She achieved at keeping her SHC-status, although she has two sons over the age of 18 living in the household, by arranging the engagement of her eldest son Rami to her niece, and by issuing a forged certificate which cost 250,000 Lira (150 USD) declaring that her son Hasan, aged 18, was enrolled at a vocational school (which he was not), and thus unable to support the family. Sana thus fulfils UNRWA's conditions that children over the age of 18 who are either establishing their own households (Rami) or studying (Hasan) would not be regarded as bread-winners. Sana thus retains her SHC-status. She admits she has a problem keeping the SHC-status next year because her son Munir will then turn 18, but thinks that it is possible to issue another forged statement that Munir is studying.

In short, Sana sought to retain her SHC status because the foodstuffs constitute an important reserve of resources as foodstuffs. These foodstuffs are sometimes exchanged with other necessary items she might need. During the building of her new two-room dwelling she sold part of the foodstuffs and bought stones. Had Sana not arranged Rami's engagement and Hasan's forged certificate she would have decreased the assets available to her. She was therefore willing to invest the certificate fee, knowing that the rations would soon repay her financial investment.

The vital importance of having the "right" papers is illustrated by the following arrangement resulting after the intermarriage between a woman whose legal status is an UNRWA-registered 1948-refugee and a 1967-refugee whose legal papers are unsettled. According to UNRWA's patrilineal criterias of registry, a woman and her descendants loose the right to register as 1948-refugees if she marries a non-1948-refugee. In order to keep her 1948-status, one woman in Rashidiyya declined from informing UNRWA that she had changed her personal status. When she bore children, she regressed all four on the ID-card of her brother, a step which guaranteed her children a 1948-refugee status. The children would otherwise have "inherited" their father's unsettled legal status and grown up without official ID-cards.

Such measures illustrate how some Palestinians seek to decrease the legal vulnerability they are subject to following rules which are externally defined and implemented. The case also illustrates how close kinship relations between siblings are used to counterbalance the legal and economic disadvantages which was foreseen as an outcome following the intermarriage between two disparate legal personal statuses. The 1967-

legally ostracised husband apparently views that his children's future opportunities are best guarded with a settled legal status as 1948-refugees. He is willing to guarantee his children's future opportunities at the cost of not being officially recognised as the father of his children. In a patrilineal society where children follow the father's kin, this step shows the pivotal importance of having what the father perceives as the “right papers”, namely those which increase the economic and legal opportunities available for his offspring and not those that prove his own fatherhood, thereby diminishing the legal obstacles occurring as a result of mix-marriages.

Besides the economic importance of the UNRWA-card for many refugees, the UNRWA-registration is perceived as a clear formal identification of their right as refugees who were once thrown out of their land. A respondent in the camp of Askar on the West Bank could recall that his family was offered to sell his UNRWA-card, but that he had refused because the card was proof that they were refugees and that they had the right to return. People's attitudes seem to be torn between the aversion to move out of the camp and the desire to stay together with relatives and neighbours on a space of land with UN protection.

In the camp of Rashidiyya, Abu Raif complained about the decrease of UNRWA-services since the beginning of 1990.¹⁹ He comments on the change of UNRWA's title printed on the new SHC-registration-cards which were issued in 1993: “UNRWA's name has been removed. Our registration cards do not bear the title of *United Nation's Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)*, they are currently issued by *The International Relief Agency (wikalat al-ghawth al-dawliyya)*. There is a tremendous change of responsibility here: reference to us as “Palestine Refugees” is not included on the new cards. We are only persons in need of rations just like other destitute people like those in Rwanda”. Some refugees are thus wondering whether UNRWA's decreased services is a process which will eventually deprive them of their special status as *Palestinian* refugees, and not as regular displaced persons like other refugees.

In sum, the UNRWA-status is a legal and economic asset which provides membership and access to a welfare system that refugees enjoy, and in some cases try to maximise. For some refugees, such as unregistered,

¹⁹Among these services are the “kitchen” which used to serve hot meals daily for children, SHCs and other needy; school materials and effects without pay, and free-of-charge referral slips to seek medical specialists and undergo hospital-operations without pay; distribution of clothes and blankets in wintertime; scholarships for higher education.

and therefore non-card holders, non-membership in UNRWA is a formal disadvantage since they are formally excluded from a range of sought-after goods and services in the camp, such as health services and education. Other refugees who are entitled to UNRWA-services may live outside camps, such as Palestinians living in Amman who are in a social-class position where they are not in need of UNRWA's economic and social services and therefore do not seek them.

In Lebanon, the possession of an UNRWA-card has an additional legal status due to the government's terms of conditionally requiring refugees of possessing UNRWA-cards for the issuing of residence permits and ID-cards. This situation jeopardizes the personal security situation of unregistered refugees and adds a legal significance to UNRWA's registration system, which the system did not have at the time of registration.

Conclusion

Palestinian refugees are a legally multifaceted group of people formally separated by a range of laws and regulations set by the governments of different host-countries and by the working definition and criterias constructed by UNRWA. The numerous wars and historical upheavals have resulted in several evacuations from their places of residence.

What appears to be a common denominator that distinguishes the legal separation of Palestinians is, first, the *external character* of these legal identifications. Whether established by UNRWA, or the respective host-countries, Palestinians are subjected to definitions and regulations which are termed and formed by external actors and events.

Secondly, there exists a *conflict of interest at the state-level* regarding the response to the Palestinian presence in the different countries where Palestinians reside. Governments are primarily concerned about the authority of the state in the presence of considerable numbers of Palestinians. A dilemma arises as to whether a certain government sees its interest enhanced by extending civil rights and including Palestinians as citizens in the respective host-societies, or whether the state's security objectives are best preserved by applying a policy of segregation or limited incorporation. Common for all host-countries is a response that may be described as the application of a "politics of convenience" (Sayigh 1994a:25) reflected by the variety of rights and duties Palestinians are subjected to, and where the paramount objective has been the preservation of the existing state-authority.

Thirdly, on the individual level, there appears to be an *inherent contradiction* between the expansion of civic rights accorded to refugees, and the maintenance of a Palestinian refugee identity which is, by some Palestinians, perceived to be preserved by segregation from the other members of society. A refugee status is recognised by the unequal opportunities, rights and duties available between non-citizens (refugees) and citizens. The refugee status as a focus element in the society where Palestinians reside is thus reproduced. As a result of the extension of civil rights, the clear-cut concept of the destitute Palestinian refugee inevitably becomes more complicated and liable to change content as the socio-economic and political framework is altered offering more formal opportunities than previously granted. In short, the premises which form the Palestinian identity as a first and foremost a *refugee*-identity becomes less distinct when Palestinians are accorded equal civil rights in the states where they reside.

The widening of civil rights accorded to Palestinians within the host-countries have, nevertheless, not resulted in assimilation such as the case of Jordan illustrates.

However, in Lebanon where a group of Palestinian refugees have the opportunity of voluntarily seeking a citizenship, the strategies applied by individuals and households reveal to a great extent the refugees' style of adaptation, the alternatives available and the dilemmas arising following the choice of retaining a Palestinian refugee identity or applying for a Lebanese nationality.

The measures applied by refugees in order to encounter and decrease the formal obstacles they face in different states are often the result of strategic choices undertaken under more or less restrictive regulations. Refugees seek to better and increase the opportunities available to them. Whether refugees seek to maintain an SHC-status in the UNRWA-welfare system, ensure that offspring are granted an official legal status, or whether measures include illegal steps such as membership in a political group or seeking illegal work in Israel, they illustrate different strategies of survival that Palestinians apply when faced with formal barriers in different states.

Chapter 4

The Construction of community

A community, such as a village or refugee camp, is not an entity *a priori*. Rather, communities are created and reproduced in an ongoing process. In this study, the *construction of community* refers to the creation and reproduction of local social organisation. A particular challenge is the observation and identification of networks not located in a specific place, but which are still local in the sense that subjects or members are known and organised (Appadurai 1993). The spreading networks of Palestinian emigrants and their families around the world are an example where locality is not confined to a defined geographical space.

As mentioned in the introduction, an analysis of adaptation must necessarily focus on the groups or units that adapt. It is convenient to refer to this group as a *decision making unit*, i.e. an individual or social group that undertakes decisions. If the unit is composed of several individuals it is thereby a corporate group in the context of that decision.

As the decision making units are variously constituted, so are their contexts. It is convenient to refer to the various contexts in which decisions are enacted as social fields, i.e. areas of social organisation which are relevant for the decisions. For some decisions such as those regarding treatment for illness, the local structures set up by UNRWA make out the relevant social field. For other decisions, wider social fields may be involved, such as the far flung networks of the labour migrants in the Gulf, or the labour market within Israel or Jordan. Such fields then, may have different scale, in that they may involve smaller or greater numbers of actors, and have different geographical coverage (Grønhaug 1978).

The question of decision making units is particularly important because Palestinian social organisation has frequently been described as one involving several different levels of such units. On the first level above the individual is the household. The household may be extended, usually by several sons living in the same house as their father together with their wives. In such a case the original house of the parents, the *bet*, is transformed into a compound household, the *dar*. Above the levels of the house and household is the clan, *hamula*, which consists of the descendants in the male line from a common ancestor. The hamula is localised. It may be restricted to a single village, and a village usually consists of but

a few hamulas. The hamula has a council and a leader elected from one of the households of the hamula. The hamula is preferentially endogamous²⁰. Statistics from the West Bank show the fairly high percentage of marriage within the hamula of around 40. The percentage appears to be rather stable, with no compelling evidence of recent decline (Ata 1986: 62).

The household, compound household and the hamula are decision making units which relate to matters internal to the hamula, such as marriage, inheritance, social security arrangements for members in need. It extends credit for members by pooling resources and it regulates land distribution and may own land. The hamula is also an important corporate group in local politics in relation to other hamulas. It is integrated into local politics through the *baladiyya*, i.e. the village council where members of the different hamulas come together.

In the town and city context the hamula loses its closed geographical reference, and it is in many cases spread over large distances. However, the preference towards endogamy is still there, and it may still retain its council and leader.

The wide range of decisions which may be brought up before the hamula and *baladiyya* is not a static set. Rather, the extent to which the different decision making units are involved appears to vary by how the social fields in which they are parts are constituted.

To understand the constitution of decision making units and social fields it is useful to take as a point of departure some experiences made by a Palestinian refugee family:

Abu Ghassan (65) is living with his wife, four sons, youngest daughter, oldest son's wife and four grandchildren in Amman. Abu Ghassan worked in the Municipality of Amman before he retired last year, and is entitled to a pension as all state or municipality employees. Only his two eldest sons are working; Ghassan as an official in a governmental department, and Ismail as a carpenter in the Ministry of Education. The third son, Mussa, has been studying civil engineering for the past five years in the Philippines. One son and one daughter staying at home are unemployed. Two daughters are married - with Palestinians - and live outside the household.

It is Abu Ghassan's wife who takes care of the family's economy. The two employed sons pay half of their salaries to Umm Ghassan every month. That means half of Ghassan's salary of 150 JD (240 USD), and half of Ismail's 120 JD (192 USD) salary is added

²⁰ I.e. marriages take place preferentially within the group.

to Abu Ghassan's pension, which is 60 JD (96 USD) monthly. In addition there are some savings left of the 2,000 JD (3,200 USD) Abu Ghassan received as grants from the municipality when he retired.

The main investment during the last years has been Ghassan's studies abroad, which cost 200 JD (320 USD) monthly. Abu Ghassan lived in the Nasser refugee camp until 1980. The main reason for moving out from the camp was, according to Abu Ghassan, the insecure feeling of not owning his house. "At any time, I felt that the government could take it from us", he says. The two-room UNRWA-flat was quite overcrowded for the two parents and seven children. The new house, raised just 50 meters outside the camp, cost about 20.000 JD (32,000 USD) and has been his biggest economic investment. In addition to his well-paid work as a bulldozer and a truck driver, he has earned money through some clever land investments. But he had possibly not been able to do this if not for his work in Saudi Arabia. From 1973 to 1979 he worked as a driver in Riyadh, while his family stayed in Jordan. In 1976 he had saved money enough to buy the 600 square metres of land where he later built the house.

When Abu Ghassan left Palestine in 1948, it was a consequence of a decision in the village council of Abbassiyya. The elders came together, and it was decided that it was prudent to flee for the Israelis.

For Abu Ghassan the question of return was not relevant when he decided to move out of the camp. "From the day I left Abbassiyya with my bulldozer, filled up with my relatives, I was sure there would be no return for us", the driver says, stressing that he is not a political man. Now the question of return has suddenly been brought up again, and is interrupting his schedule. He was planning to build another storey on the house for his son, Ismail, who has asked his parents to look for a wife for him. "Is it wise to spend money on another floor now, or should we wait and see if we can return to Jericho (where he lived after 1948)?", he asks. He says he will only go back if his family is going. "I'm too old. I have lived my life outside my country. The solution is not for me, but for the next generation", he claims. Abu Ghassan admits that he will accept compensation for the land he lost in Abbassiyya - but only if others also accept.

The life history of Abu Ghassan, as expressed here, is a story of migration. Among the most important decisions in Abu Ghassan's life have been first, leaving Abbassiyya and later Palestine; second, leaving for labour migration to Saudi Arabia; and third, leaving the Nasr Camp.

In the decisions of Abu Ghassan, different decision making units were involved. The first decision to leave his native land was a collective decision in the village council, his other decisions to migrate have been taken at the household level. The social fields involved have also changed. Until the 1948 war, the dominant social field was that of the village, and most of Abu Ghassan's activity was structured within that field. The community, as a local organisation, coincided with the most important activities of social and physical reproduction. The upheavals which followed the war and flight, resulted in a divergence of social fields: the field of external migration, the labour market in Jordan and the camp. This went together with a reduction in the scale of the decision making units: the *baladiyya* and *hamula* became less important, while the household emerged as a more independent decision making body.

However, the case of Abu Ghassan tells far from the whole story. It may, nevertheless, serve as an introduction to the several processes that have led to the construction of the present day Palestinian communities.

An important background for these processes is the very establishment of new localities where people settled after the exodus. To a large extent, the new localities were constructed by other actors than the Palestinians themselves. This was the case in camps established by UNRWA where Palestinians were directed to settle. Other Palestinians settled in already established neighbourhoods in the host-society.

However, we will not dwell with the history of the various Palestinian communities in the early years after 1948. Of more importance for the present analysis is how Palestinians adapted to their new environments, given the structures erected by UNRWA and the host-countries. These adaptations may be grouped into two sets of processes.

The first set is the reorganising and regrouping by people themselves. The second is the natural development of the households and families of the refugees. The third is how the construction of the community was affected and formed by the relationship between the refugees and those already living in the area of settlement.

As a result of these three sets of processes, the reorganising of people's lives affected their self-identity and created new reference groups of identification.

The establishment of communities

The humanitarian problems among the refugees increased in the period after the flight of 1948. The international community responded to the mass influx of refugees by establishing UNRWA in 1949. The Agency established camps, provided humanitarian relief and health services to Palestinians who had lost their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the war. Relief aid was not restricted to those living inside camps, but was also provided to persons living outside camps. As time went by, the camps developed into more permanent institutions.

Although the flight in 1948 tore apart social bonds, the resulting distribution of the Palestinian population was not completely random. Much of the order in the distribution appears to be related to the different social backgrounds of the Palestinians. Some were villagers, others townspeople, and they had diverse educational and occupational experiences. Two case studies depicting different life-stories should make us able to deepen our understanding of the processes of social reorganisation and the construction of new communities. The first concerns a family that moved to Askar on the West Bank:

Latifa was about 20 years old in 1948. Her family came from the village of Jamasin, near Jaffa, and were peasants. She had been married to her patrilinear grandfather's cousin, and they had two small girls. According to her, it was the old generation that had decided what they should do in 1948. "Jews killed Arabs, and Arabs killed Jews. These were bad time. We went because all the others left," she says. They lived in Qalqilia the first year, but did not feel safe from the Jews who lived not far away, so they decided to move on. In Rafidia village in Nablus they lived about two years. "We stayed in tents, like the bedouins. It was a hard life, our eldest daughter died there. When UNRWA came to Rafidia and asked us to go to the newly established Askar camp, we went", she says. "If you were poor you would go, if you had money you would not go. We had no money, and no place to go", she explains. Their decision to settle in the camp was taken with other people from their family and village. Her husband worked in farming in the Jordan Valley during their stay in Rafidia. He worked hard, and the living conditions were poor. In Askar camp her husband reunited with his family. He started working with a trolley, transporting different goods from the main road to people's houses.

While Latifa and her family were peasants, the second case is that of city people:

Dr. Ja'far was born in Jerusalem in 1941. His father was a successful merchant in West Jerusalem. The family fled in 1948 to Hebron, where they stayed in the house of Ja'far's grandfather. Ja'far went to study in Cairo, and graduated in 1967 - in the middle of the Six Day War. His family stayed in Hebron, where they are still living together with Ja'far's mother. Ja'far was not allowed to return to Hebron because of the Israeli occupation, he settled therefore in Amman where he worked as a doctor. A year later he went to Saudi Arabia. He was offered a job by the Saudi Health Minister who was visiting Amman. In Saudi Arabia he met his wife. In 1978, Ja'far came back to Amman together with his wife and children, and opened a private medical clinic. He worked for seven years in the clinic before the family again returned to Saudi Arabia. They stayed there until they were forced to leave during the Gulf War in 1991.

The most important difference between the two cases is the nature of the assets individuals and households could muster following different crises. The resources of Latifa's family were tied to their land, while that of Ja'far's family was more intangible, and therefore, paradoxically, more durable. When Latifa and her family became dispossessed of their land, they had literally no place to go: poor peasants did not have the widespread network of the educated city elite or merchants. Therefore, they "lived in tents in the olive-groves". The camps offered a way to be reunited with some of their kin and former neighbours. This is partly revealed in the settlement pattern in the camp of Askar in the West Bank. The refugees residing there originated predominantly from 25 villages and towns in the Jaffa and Haifa area. In Latifa's part of the camp, most people came from Jamasin, the same village as Latifa. In the camp, their neighbourhood carries the name of their place of origin. In this respect Askar is not exceptional; the same pattern is found in many other camps. In some cases the neighbourhoods are named after the residents' original villages in Palestine. In Rashidiyya, for instance, the quarters are named "harat Kweikat", "harat Alma", and "harat Fari'a" referring to the names of Palestinian villages in the Galilee. In these quarters many houses are currently inhabited by extended families who are related to each other through intermarriage.

A study by Ennab (1989) corroborates the picture of the camps as partly structured along pre-existing lines. According to him, the motives for choice of camps for those who arrived in the period between 1948 and

1966 was influenced by different factors: 41 per cent made their choice on the bases of social ties, i.e. the presence of relatives, friends or people from the same place of origin. More than 33 per cent had been forced to move from their first place of refuge, and a further 21 per cent made their choice for economic reasons. From 1967, economic motives became dominant: 45 per cent of the respondents moved in search of bettered economic opportunities. Resettlement due to social ties accounted for 41 per cent of the respondents, while 8 per cent were resettled by force, mainly because of the Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank (ibid:115-117).

The city dweller Dr. Ja'far was in another situation than that of Latifa, because he could go to his grandfather's house after the exodus of his family in 1948. There he joined part of his family. But the difference is more one of resources than of principle: both settled with kin, the difference lay in the situation of the kinsmen. When Ja'far in 1967 for the second time was forced to abandon his home, he was able, due to his profession as a doctor, to obtain work in Saudi Arabia. In 1991, a third political event over which he had no control, the Gulf War, caused his departure from Saudi Arabia. He was dismissed from his job and asked to leave the country along with thousands of Palestinians who were no longer welcome in the Gulf following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Ja'far was again able to restructure his life and start anew working as a surgeon in Amman. The most important assets in Ja'far's coping strategies were the widespread residence pattern of his kin, his professional network, and his highly convertible education as a medical doctor.

On the more general level, differences such as those between Latifa and Ja'far appear to have reproduced and perhaps expanded a pre-existing pattern of social differences between refugees. The camp populations were composed mainly of former peasants and bedouins, poor and without land after the exodus, who had little education. The city neighbourhoods, in contrast, were composed of refugees with some kind of pre-existing network to the area. Our findings are supported by the conclusions drawn by Salah in a doctoral dissertation where the neighbourhoods of Wihdat and Baqa'a were compared with neighbourhoods outside the camps. She concludes that there exists a high correlation between educational level, place of origin and refugee resettlement (1986:198-199).

Nevertheless, the camps should not be portrayed as a simple reproduction of pre-existing social ties. They are also meeting places of people from diverse origins, especially geographically. For instance, while villagers of Abbasiyya fled as a group, they did not all end up in the same camps.

Further, as the history of Abu Ghassan showed, some left the camps after a while.

A study of eight refugee camps in the West Bank indicates that there has been three main waves of settling in camps. Only 36% of heads of household living in refugee camps arrived during the period 1948-50. A further 48% arrived between 1951 and 1966, a period where many were transferred from unofficial to official camps (Ennab 1989). This is also brought out by the camps in our study: Wihdat in Jordan was established in 1955, and Rashidiyya was enlarged in 1964 in order to house Palestinian refugees transferred from the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon. The camp of Baqa'a in Jordan was established in 1968 and had the function of gathering people living in different localities in the Jordan Valley after they fled from the fighting in 1967.

Camp and not camp

One of the main distinguishing features of the camps as opposed to other modes of refugee settlement is that the camps make out readily identifiable localities. As one Palestinian puts it:

You don't need to live in a refugee camp to be a refugee. The most important thing is that you have a refugee card. The card proves that we are entitled to UNRWA services. It also proves that we were kicked out of our land. Who likes living in a camp, in one room with your parents, and your brothers and their families in other rooms, all sharing one kitchen and one toilet? No one enjoys such a life! Many would move if they had money to buy better houses. Still, the camps symbolise that our people do not own the land they live upon. They own another piece of land.

The camps are here portrayed as important symbols of the Palestinian plight. To some extent, refugee camps represent Palestinian cultural and national islands where social interaction with the native inhabitants in the host-society are much less frequent than outside the camps. Although Palestinian refugee camps have the same facilities as other living areas, to settle and live in a refugee camp symbolises a situation of emergency, a political situation of being in exile. Despite the fact that Palestinians residing outside camps have strong national aspirations and are frequently national activists, moving out of a camp symbolises assimilation into the host society. Likewise, leaving the camp also implies leaving the refugee community, and to some extent, the status and possibly, the *identity* as a refugee in the long run.

However, the speaker also paints a bleak picture of the conditions in the camps. The focus on overcrowding is by no means unique. The lack of space is acute, as the population in most camps has grown more or less uninterrupted. The geographical boundaries of the camps are fixed, so all space for new houses has generally been used. Similarly, the available space for enlarging houses is severely limited. UNRWA regulated the enlargement of houses in the camps, so that refugees needed permits in order to undertake enlargements of dwellings. However, UNRWA regulations were not followed in times of crisis, such as during the civil war in Lebanon and following the mass influx of Palestinian returnees to Jordan following the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait. People enlarged their houses vertically without permission. Nevertheless, the physical boundaries of the camp put limits to the building activities, and in many camps there is not enough land to build new houses.

A case study from Askar illustrates how one family has coped with the space constraints:

Maher's family came originally from the village of Yamasin near the port-town of Jaffa. In 1948 his family fled to the West Bank. Maher has lived in Askar with his parents, four of his brothers and one sister. When he married he settled in his father's house where his wife and he had their own room, but they shared the kitchen and the bathroom with the rest of the family. Maher's household was an extended family type of household, with multiple families residing in one house. They got three children in four years, thus increasing the number of household members. Maher and his wife grew dissatisfied with their housing conditions and started looking for a new dwelling.

Maher worked as a driver and housekeeper for a rich man in Nablus. This man gave Maher the 1,500 JD he needed to buy a house in the camp and establish his own separate household. The owner of the house had left the West Bank in 1967. UNRWA allowed Maher to move into the house and to build two rooms. After living in this house for 11 years, Maher and his wife decided to move out of the camp. Different factors made him move. He had by now seven children and the house was too small. He felt that his neighbourhood in the camp was too noisy. The houses were too close- he could hear the neighbour's radio and what they were arguing about. When his boss gave him 35,000 JD (56,000 USD), he had the means necessary to buy an apartment in 1987. He sold the house in the camp to his nephew for the same price he bought it for.

However, Maher and his family lived in the apartment for only three years before deciding to move back to the camp. He felt as a stranger in the apartment living outside the camp, he explains. His family did not know the people there, and did not feel familiar with the traditions of their new neighbours. His wife felt secluded in the new apartment and missed her old neighbourhood with her relatives and friends living close to her. The children spent most of their time at their grandparents in the camp. They wanted to be together with their friends from school. In the first years of the intifada, it was better to live in the camp, according to Maher. They knew people, and if any problems occurred in the street, everybody could enter any house in the camp.

When a big house of good standard was for sale in the camp, Maher decided to buy it paying 13,000 JD (20,800 USD). The house has three floors, and is too high according to UNRWA's regulations. As most houses in the camp, it was enlarged during the intifada. His wife was glad to move back to the camp, and is happy that the house is big enough to house the eldest son when he marries. Two of her brothers are close neighbours and her husband's family lives in the same quarter. However, they have kept the house outside the camp because they expect prices to rise in the future, besides, one of the children might move out of the camp.

The case illustrates some of the main decisions and considerations regarding residence choice. The *developmental cycle* of the domestic group emerges as important. The concept refers to cyclical changes in the size and composition of the family. Households are created when a couple marry, they are enlarged by the bearing of children and reduced in size through death. The cycle is completed through the creation of new households for each of the children (Fortes 1971). In the case of the Maher family the stages of the development cycle brings to the front the decisions concerning where to stay.

Among Palestinian peasants, a woman will move from her parents' household to that of her husband upon marriage. Then, the preference would be that the couple stay in the house of the husband's parents, but they could also set up a new house. The peasant house, the *bet*, had one room. When the sons married more rooms were added, each with separate doors. The house turned into a compound household, a *dar*. Maher's case shows that there was not enough space within the family's plot to accommodate all the children's households. The pressure on the common bath and kitchen became too high. Two possibilities emerged for solving the housing problem. The extended family could move together to a bigger dwelling, or they could split up into several separate household

units. There were no large houses available in the camp at the time when Maher moved for the first time. Therefore, if the extended family should have kept together, they would have had to move out of the camp. As house prices in Nablus town were much higher than in the camp, they could not afford to buy a big house to accommodate the extended family. Maher, who had enough capital and had more freedom of choice than the other household members, moved therefore to a separate house inside the camp.

Socially, Maher shows an ambivalence concerning where to establish his own independent household as portrayed above: he moves out of the camp, but finds it difficult to adapt to the town neighbourhood. This illustrates how camps have become neighbourhoods and localities where people belong. They are places where people are born, grow up, go to school, marry and establish households. Contrary to what Marx (1971) concludes in his study of refugee camps in the West Bank in which he argues that camps have become regular neighbourhoods where both refugees and non-refugees live, we hold that refugee camps are special neighbourhoods. They are predominantly inhabited by Palestinians with a refugee status who have over the years developed a sense of belonging to the camp community. Of the 2,324 households in Askar, for instance, there were 40 families with a total of 192 persons, non-registered refugees. There were only 5 families consisting of 23 persons who were non-refugees (UNRWA - West Bank Field Office, July 1994). Similarly, for the whole of the West Bank, only three per cent of the households in the camps are non-refugees according to the FAFO-survey of economic adaptations to the border closure (Øvensen 1994). Similarly, the camps are not considered as regular neighbourhoods by native inhabitants living outside camps. Camps are socially defined as neighbourhoods where refugees live.

The camps are not, however, the only way of creating Palestinian communities. Palestinians are spread in different countries and reside in different localities inside countries. Some of these localities have definite geographic boundaries, others have not. An example of the latter is the creation of Palestinian “societies” in Jordan.

In Jordan, numerous societies were established during the 1970s. The societies are named after the original village which members and their parents came from. The “Hebron society”, for instance, is open for anyone who can trace his or her descent to Hebron, no matter where they live in Jordan. The societies arrange cultural meetings for members, picnics and other activities for families. Weddings can be celebrated in the halls of the societies. Money is collected from the members to help poorer

members, support the victims of the *intifada*, and erect kindergartens and schools for orphans.

The societies consist of a council with the different *hamulas* of the place of origin represented. If there are any problems between members of two *hamulas* in the society, the council has the right to mediate between the two groups. The legal importance of these meetings is illustrated by the fact that a policeman is present at the mediation where the two groups discuss the subject of dispute and takes notes of the agreement arrived at. This may later be used in court.

In some areas, the societies establish their own institutions such as orphanages or kindergartens where only Palestinian children are enrolled. In other areas, such as the mediating role of the councils in case of disputes, the societies are integral part of the legal system in Jordan.

These societies can be considered as localities which provide contexts where people from a common place of origin are able to come together in order to express and reformulate their common identity. In some ways, we can observe the re-emergence of the *hamula* institution within these societies, and new corporate groups have been reconstituted with the important difference that these groups are based on the geographical place of *origin* of members rather than their present residence.

We should also not create a picture where the only importance of kinship among Palestinians is seen as that of geographically close communities characterised by loose corporate group formation. According to the World Bank, about 40 per cent of families in the Occupied Territories had family members living abroad (World Bank 1993:xi). The networks built by those relations are clearly important, as the case of Dr. Ja'far shows.

It will be recalled that when Dr. Ja'far's father lost both home and business in Jerusalem after 1948, the family was able to resettle in his grandfather's house in Hebron. When he moved to Amman he stayed with his sister. In Saudi Arabia, however, he rented an apartment which was owned by a Palestinian from Nablus who worked in the Saudi Health Ministry. This man also introduced Ja'far to his niece, whom Ja'far eventually married. Although Ja'far and his landlord were not related, they met as Palestinian friends and fellow emigrants. Except for the period of the *intifada* both of them have frequent visits from the West Bank which keep family ties alive. Here, the kinship merges with friendship and experience of common hardships, which again is transformed into kinship by marriage.

Social ties between refugees and hosts

Although we have described the camps as “places apart”, there are marked differences in the relation between the host population and the refugees. An important factor is whether the refugees had previous contact with the inhabitants of the area to which they fled, or whether refugees were strangers in their new environments. When the latter was the case, refugees regrouped themselves in camps where they recreated new social communities among themselves. However, social ties were established with inhabitants in the host-society, mainly through economic activities.

Maher, for instance, was employed as a driver for a rich Palestinian in Nablus who was himself not a refugee. With time, the relationship evolved into one of patron-client in which Maher became an indispensable worker who helped the rich man in all practical matters, especially since the rich man did not have children. Maher was thus “treated as a son” by the rich man who granted Maher the sum of 35,000 JD (56,000 USD) which enabled him to buy the apartment outside the camp. Having a peasant-background and being a 1948-refugee in the West-Bank, Maher was not able to bolster his economic ties by establishing closer social relations, such as marriage, with the rich man's family in Nablus. Different social class backgrounds clearly prevented the constitution of stronger social ties, maintaining the relationship on a lower social level.

The case of Omar, presented in chapter four, illustrates however, how closer social bonds were established through marriage between a 1948-refugee and a native Arab Israeli, precisely because both had common social class-backgrounds. Through his work in Israel, Omar was presented to the niece of a fellow construction worker who himself was a native inhabitant of Israel resulting in an engagement between the Arab Israeli's niece and Omar was concluded. Economic bonds initially established as a result of refugee and native inhabitant working together were thereby bolstered and transformed into strong social ties.

In Lebanon, the relationship between Lebanese and Palestinians living in the south has been one of both peaceful and hostile relationship. The common socio-economic lower-class rural background, and until the beginning of the 1980s, mutual objectives in Arab political issues in general, and in their struggle against Israel in particular, constituted basic elements in the relationship between Palestinians and the Lebanese Shi'a in south Lebanon. The political and military growth of the PLO caused escalation of conflict between the two communities resulted, however, in a deteriorated relationship between Palestinians and the population in south Lebanon. The Shi'a accused the Palestinians of exploiting their

hospitality and turning the “Palestinian revolution (into) a Palestinian business in Lebanon” as one contemptuous *mukhtar* (village leader) indicated (Norton 1987:60). What was long perceived as a “natural alliance” between the two communities was severely deteriorated following the Camps War in 1986/87 when Rashidiyya and other Palestinian camps were besieged for six months by the Shiite Amal militants.

The case of the Palestinians in Lebanon indicate that common social-class background as well as political objectives between the refugee population and the host-society was not enough to prevent military confrontation between the two communities. There are several external political factors which explain the evolving of hostile relationships between the two groups which we do not need to enter into here. Suffice it to indicate that socio-economic and political commonalties between the two groups eventually developed into a competitive relationship whereby the host-community, the south Lebanese, reached a point where it did not accept the development of an independent Palestinian military organisation, and resented that Palestinians had access to an elaborate welfare and health system offered by UNRWA which were denied to Lebanese. It is not unusual to hear Lebanese complaining about Palestinians who receive international assistance, while nobody is concerned about the Lebanese. This imbalance was obvious in the late 1970s and during the 1980s. The case suggest therefore that the economic and social advantages which the refugee community enjoys, have had a long term disintegrating effect on the social relation between refugees and the host population. However, the change in attitude from welcome to mistrust is well documented from studies of refugee situations in other parts of the world (Kibreab 1991).

Marriage patterns: marriage within the clan or outside

A description of marriage patterns is useful to analyse some of the aspects of social relations between the refugee and the host communities. This is because marriage may be understood as symbolising some of the strongest social ties that can be constituted between two social groups.

The classically described preferred marriage among Palestinians is that of endogamous marriage between members of the same clan, and in particular marriage between the children of two brothers. Among the effects of such marriage practices is that the clan becomes a sharply delineated social group, with few ties to other clans. Data from several

studies (Ata 1986; Tuastad 1993) suggest that rate of endogamous marriage among Palestinians is fairly stable and high at around forty per cent. The high rate of endogamous marriage undoubtedly contributes to the reproduction of particular Palestinian communities as distinct and bounded units, be they villages, refugee camps or urban neighbourhoods.

Maheer, presented earlier in this chapter, followed a traditional marriage pattern. He married his cousin who lived in the same *hara* (neighbourhood) as himself. His family and the family of his wife came both from the village of Yamasin. The couple settled in the house of Maheer's parents, thus abiding with the practice of enlarging the original house of the parents, the *bet*, into a compound household, a *dar*. Before Maheer decided to move out of the camp, he followed the endogamous marriage and housing pattern which can be traced in traditional Palestinian marriage practices. After living in a neighbourhood outside the camp for three years, he decided to move back to the camp. His decision to return to the camp indicates that his relationship with the native host-country inhabitants in the neighbourhood outside the camp was not satisfactory. He preferred to maintain and strengthen his social ties with his kin and neighbours in the camp, rather than establishing new social ties with the native inhabitants of Nablus who were non-refugees.

Contrary to Maheer, other Palestinians broke away from the traditional endogamous marriage pattern and married into the native host-community. Inter-marriage thus serves to underline other kinds of networks between the host and refugee communities, represent thereby alliance-building between the two groupings. The relatively common practice of inter-marriage between south Lebanese and Palestinians is a case in point. Most Palestinians residing in Rashidiyya, for instance, are Sunni Moslems, but marriage with Lebanese Shiites, the major confessional group in the south, occurs, and could be traced in many households when respondents conveyed the marriage pattern of members within the extended family. Contact between the two communities preceded the 1948 war. The Palestinian population in the Galilee had regular contact with what was to become the host community in south Lebanon. Palestinians from the Galilee region had extensive trade with the south Lebanese before 1948 as Haifa was more important as a port for south Lebanon than the capital of Beirut. Sana, the Lebanese Shiite introduced in chapter four, represents an example of inter-marriage between a Palestinian and a Leb-

anese. Her father's marriage pattern also illustrates an example of intermarriage between the host- and the refugee-community:

Sana's mother is Lebanese, her father however, has both ID-cards. He is originally from Haifa, but came on regular visits to the south of Lebanon before 1948. During one of his visits, a Lebanese census was being carried out, and he registered himself as an inhabitant in Lebanon which enabled him later to receive a Lebanese citizenship. In 1948 he left Palestine and when it became possible he registered himself as a refugee and received an UNRWA-card along with the other residents of his village. According to Sana, her father felt most Lebanese and had little to do with Palestinians since he kept on living in a Lebanese village where he married a Lebanese. Sana's sister, Fadia, who lives in her father's village was on a visit during the interview. Fadia is married to a Christian Lebanese from her village, and their daughter is currently engaged to Sana's eldest son Rami.

In Sana's family we find two examples of intermarriage; one concluded between Sana's Palestinian father and her Lebanese mother, and one concluded between herself and her Palestinian husband. Two cases also illustrate marriage across religious cleavages. The marriage between Sana's father and her mother conveys an example of intermarriage between a Sunni and a Shi'a Moslem, while Sana's sister Fadia, being a Sunni Moslem (following her father's religious affiliation), married a Christian Lebanese.

Marriage across religious lines has a long tradition among Palestinians. Granqvist (1935) shows from her studies in the village of Artas near Bethlehem, that common religious background was not a decisive factor for marriage between couples. Marriage between Christians and Moslems was quite common. She argues that other social factors, such as class and political influence were more important than religion. In the case of Sana, the common social standing of the couple was probably crucial. Sana's father married a stranger who had another confessional background than himself. He was a Sunni Moslem while his wife was a Shi'a Moslem. In the case of Sana's father, the knowledge of Lebanon and his previous network in the country through his numerous business trips, made it possible for him to marry a Lebanese girl when he came to Lebanon after the 1948 exodus.

When recalling Sana's attitude against applying for a Lebanese citizenship for her Palestinian children, we note that the experiences of the

two sisters, Sana married to a Palestinian and Fadia married to a Christian Lebanese, have affected their self-identification as Palestinian and Lebanese respectively. At the same time, their family relations are strengthened through the current engagement between Sana's son to her sister Fadia's daughter.

The various marriage patterns illustrated by Sana's family indicate long-term economic and social contact between refugee and host-society which were established long before 1948. Strong social ties appear to be maintained at the household level in families where intermarriage already exist, despite cleavages between the two groupings at the political level. The engagement between Sana's son who is raised in Rashidiyya and considers himself as Palestinian, and Sana's niece who is raised in a Lebanese village and considers herself as Lebanese is a case in point.

Conclusion

The 1948-exodus of Palestinians from their homeland affected the traditional social organisation of Palestinian communities found in both urban and rural areas profoundly. The ongoing process of social organisation among the refugees, however, re-established old social ties, and resulted in the formation of new ties.

In this chapter, we have focused on the process whereby communities re-emerged. In some ways social organisation perpetuated the traditional social organisation of Palestinians, in other ways the reconstruction of communities established distinct forms of organisation based on new economic, political and social ties.

On the one hand, the pre-existing social organisation perpetuated and affected the construction of communities in the new setting on two levels. First, the urban-rural cleavage which existed before the exodus re-emerged clearly in the formation of new communities: Town-dwellers, sought primarily cities. They had either the experience of living in a town and were thereby able to exploit the possibilities available there, or they had the means of drawing advantage of their profession in the new setting. Dr Ja'far, for instance, was able to exercise his profession as a doctor regardless of his place of residence. Peasants, on the other hand, became either without land or they lost their means of livelihood. They sought work in the only sector they mastered, agriculture, and settled therefore in rural settings in the host-societies.

Second, kinship ties as well as geographical ties constituted the basis of network formation in the early years of resettlement: Rather than being placed randomly in different camps by external actors (such as UNRWA), many Palestinians effected personal preferences and regrouped together with their kin and other members of the same village as themselves. Today we still find neighbourhoods in different refugee camps named after the original village which Palestinians fled from.

On the other hand, the construction of communities in the host-countries resulted in the composition of new forms of social organisation as refugees responded and adapted to their new environments.

An example which illustrates the establishment of new social ties in the host-communities is the formation of “societies” in Amman based on the original villages of Palestinians. The geographical traditional Palestinian village re-emerged thus in totally new surroundings, and a characteristic socio-political organisation, namely the hamula-system, gained new legal importance in the new settings as authoritative conflict-management groupings recognised by the Jordanian judicial system.

The establishment of economic and social relations with inhabitants of the host-communities represent another example of formation of new forms of social ties in the host-communities. In some cases, economic ties which were created as a result of refugees and natives working together (as in the case of Omar in Askar) or as a result of long-term trade (as the case was for Sana's father in south Lebanon) were eventually bolstered through marriage ties. Inter-marriage between Palestinians and the host-community thus introduces new forms of marriage patterns which diverge from the traditional endogamous marriage pattern found in Palestinian families.

Other Palestinians, however, did not integrate into their new neighbourhood. Maher and his wife had lived long enough in the refugee camp, which, despite being part of a Palestinian community, had become a separate refugee-neighbourhood within the larger Palestinian community in Nablus on the West Bank.

Chapter 5

The economic adaptation

How have the Palestinian refugees adapted economically in the communities where they live? By economic adaptation we here mean the way the refugees cope with the economic challenges in the state they reside in. Two factors must be analysed in this context: The resources refugees had with them at the time of their flight, and the new economic conditions in the countries where they were to reside. As we have shown, the Palestinians do not constitute a homogenous economic group. Different segments had very unequal economic resources, which they brought with them into the state of Diaspora, thus leaving the refugees with different starting points.

Beside being linked to their socio-economic background, the economic adaptation is closely connected to the new economic conditions in the different types of communities which the refugees have become part of; a camp, a neighbourhood, a region, a country. Economically, the setting in the society where Palestinians settled is a frame of both limits and possibilities. The state's regulations often limit the economic prospects of refugees. At the same time, the high mobility and a wide network of contacts across national borders, primarily through relatives, have enabled Palestinians to adopt certain strategies that enhance their economic possibilities.

Strategies of adaptation: combination of activities

Among the numerous ways of coping with the economic challenges in the societies where Palestinians are residing. Some basic income generating *activities* can be identified. First, refugees obtain paid work in the state's formal or informal economy. This is the dominant income generating activity. Another activity is to send family members abroad, primarily to the Gulf countries or to the West, to work and send remittances back to the rest of the household. A third activity is investing in land or other property in the host country, an alternative available mostly for the more well-off segments of the Palestinian refugee population. The poorest refugees, those who are unable to meet their own basic needs for food and shelter, have to depend on receiving rations from UNRWA, allowances

from charity organisations or gifts from neighbours, relatives and friends. A fifth activity is a dominating long term concern; ensuring education for the children, as an investment for the future family economy.

A household can choose to depend on one or several of these activities, according to the expected short and long term outcome of the different alternatives. What we here consider as the *strategy* of adaptation refers to the actual choice of activity - or combination of activities - made by the household in order to maintain its economic viability. We can differentiate between two types of strategies: One strategy implies depending on one activity, the other is the strategy of combination. The reason for choosing the first strategy can be urgent short-time priorities where one single activity gives much better outcome than any other alternative. Another reason for depending on one activity is simply that only one option is at hand. The strategy of combining several activities might be to maximise safety, or using diverse short-time activities in order to secure long-time goals. A mixture of activities makes it possible to underpin long-time concerns, like education or accumulation of savings for later investments, through day-to-day activities by some of the family members.

This strategy of combination between different options in a situation of economic hardship and widespread underemployment, is possible because the household in many contexts functions as a decision making unit. Since the most crucial decisions concerning economy, education and movement are not taken individually, but rather inside the family circle (or by the head of the household), it is possible to compose a combination of income sources and expenditures, where pooling of resources is a basic principle. In this way, the income of those household members who have work is shared with those who are either students or unemployed.

The economic setting

The economic conditions for Palestinians are quite different in each of the places where the fieldwork was carried out. Rashidiyya in Lebanon and Baqa'a in Jordan are located in rural areas where agricultural work is a main income source. Askar and Wihdat are situated inside towns, Nablus and Amman respectively, thus giving the refugees other possibilities of employment. In addition we find differences in the legal status of Palestinians in the three areas.

What is common, though, and quite important when it comes to adaptation, is that in both Lebanon, Jordan and the West Bank, there is

a considerable informal sector functioning beside the state controlled formal economy (Richards and Waterbury 1990). By informal sector we mean that part of the economic activity which is not controlled by the state. The refugees take part in the informal sector, either because it is more profitable due to their exclusion from the formal sector, or simply because no other work is available.

The balance between the informal and formal sectors has several implications for economic adaptations. Informal activities disconnect the refugee population from the host country's *state* apparatus, and can therefore be seen as an obstacle for assimilation or incorporation. In Lebanon, for instance, Palestinians are barred from getting jobs in the state bureaucracy. In the West Bank the difference between official and non-official activities indicates, to a large extent, whether the Israeli administration is in control of the activities or not. However, as long as there also exists a huge informal economy among the native population, not only among the refugee population, the irregular economy of the *refugee population* is not necessarily a sign of segregation between Palestinians and *host country population*. Only to the extent that the refugees organise their activities separately from the host country's *informal* economy, we are able to define the economic activities as incorporating or segregating factors.

Lebanon

In general the Lebanese authorities do not issue work permits to Palestinian residents. The exclusion of the refugees from the legal labour market effectively obliges them to enter the informal sector of the economy, which is especially large, due to Lebanon's long-standing *laissez-faire* economy and the government's weak position during the past two decades.

In the civil war period of 1975-89 considerable capital was channelled through Palestinian national institutions, covering areas from social services to industrial production, as well as through political organisations. There was thereby a Palestinian economy separate from the Lebanese. By the end of the 1980's it was estimated that two thirds of the Palestinian work force was employed by the Palestinian national institutions, like the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) and the industrial co-operative Samed (Sayigh 1994a:109). This financial source has decreased lately due to PLO's financial crisis after the Gulf War of 1991. In addition, the political focus of the PLO was changed from Lebanon to the Occupied Territories whereby the PLO reduced the economic involvement in Lebanon. The loss of PLO funds, in combination with the severe crises

in the Lebanese economy, with inflation out of control and an unemployment rate of 35%, has left the refugees in Lebanon in a especially miserable and rapidly deteriorating situation (Regional Surveys of the World: The Middle East and North Africa 1994:619)

Jordan

Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship have legal rights as native East Bank Jordanians, and Palestinians are in many ways an integral part of the Jordanian economy. In some sectors, like in bank and finance they are even the dominant part. Palestinians do not hesitate to claim that “we built Jordan”, and that they are the driving force in the economy. At the same time many say that getting a job now is more difficult if you are Palestinian. In the state administration Palestinians believe that Jordanians get jobs easier than Palestinians, because employment depends on *wasta* - a personal contact inside the system. The existing *wasta*-system is a segmenting aspect of the economy, because Palestinians usually have their own network of contacts. In the private sector the network of personal relations seems even more important, especially in small firms where acquiring jobs often occur through the networks of friends or relatives.

One area of the Jordanian job market where Palestinians clearly are excluded, is the security-related field. In military academies, students are accepted only after personal interviews, giving the authorities the opportunity to prevent Palestinians from climbing in the system.

The West Bank

The West Bank economy is one of dependence. Israel is the largest market for goods and services, as well as the most important employer of the West Bank labour force. The intifada from 1987, and later the Gulf crisis of 1990 led to a sharp decrease in West Bank exports. Since the border closure of March 1993, the access for West Bank Palestinians to the Israeli job market has been limited. But Palestinian workers still cross the “green line”, which divided the occupied territories from Israel, to work in Israel, where jobs are better paid than in the West Bank. According to unpublished data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics the number of Palestinian workers in Israel fell from a level of around 120,000 right before the border closure to about 65,000 one month later. Through contact with Israeli employers, Palestinians can obtain the required labor card. But around 50% of the workers cross the border illegally, daily or weekly.

Nablus used to be the industrial centre of Jordan until the loss of the West Bank in 1967. The local manufacturing industries of soap, shoes and furniture gives employment for a part of the Askar Camp residents.

In the West Bank there is a huge informal sector of the economy, illustrating that the Israeli administration is not in control of all fields of the production. One good example is the taxi-system. In Askar Camp there are around 30 taxis - none of them registered, in contrast to most service-taxis going to nearby towns, licensed by the Israeli authorities.

Main Economic Concerns

Among the most important economic concerns we will single out three areas which Palestinians accord the highest priority: education, marriage and housing.

Education

Education is valued as a good investment, because it is perceived to lead to a well paid work, and thus improve the family's future standard of living, as well as securing a sort of pension to the parents. 50 year old Ibrahim from Askar explains his priorities: "By the money I earned from my construction work in Israel, we built another room next to the UNRWA-flat. Our house looked poorer than most houses in the neighbourhood, because we insisted on keeping our children at school, instead of letting them start working", he says.

Registered Palestinian refugees have the right to enrol their children in UNRWA-schools which follow the state's education system. UNRWA-schools are in general better than governmental schools, but they are not as good as some of the private schools.

Dr. Ja'far, the doctor presented on page 47, settled in Amman after he was forced to leave Saudi Arabia as a result of the Gulf war. Dr. Ja'far chooses to send all his children to private schools. The family uses a total of 4,000 JD (5,800 USD) yearly on education. Not only well off residents like Dr. Ja'far send their children to private schools, lower-class families also send their children to cheaper private schools, often run by missionaries or other religious foundations.

Marriage

Marriage is a main economic concern for young men who often have to save money for years before they can afford what is required for the

arrangement. Besides the wedding party and gifts to the bride, the main expense is housing, which the bridegroom is supposed to facilitate. Newly married Khaled (32) in Amman used over 5,000 JD (7,250 USD) for his marriage. His salary as a teacher is 160 JD (230 USD) monthly, which means that the marriage cost him two and a half year's income. Khaled points out his main expenses for the wedding and other arrangements: 2,000 JD (2,900 USD) for the gold he gave to the bride, 2,500 JD (3,625 USD) for furniture and painting for the new, rented flat outside Nasr Camp, where he is grown up, and 500 JD (725 USD) for the party itself. He used all his savings from seven years of work, and received a sum from his father, but still he had to borrow 1,500 JD (2,175 USD) from the bank to cover the costs.

Housing

When it comes to housing, living in a camp is the cheapest option. Those refugees who choose to settle outside the camps, can rent or buy the housing. Monthly expenses for renting a flat, or for mortgages usually constitute the largest expense-post on the household's budget. The economic aspect of the question of moving out of a camp is therefore central; some can afford it and some cannot.

Paid employment in host country

The following cases show different ways of adaptation to the different local economic conditions, and give a picture of how Palestinians participate as labour-power in the different fields of the local economy.

Agriculture

The south Lebanese camp of Rashidiyya lies in a fertile agricultural region that provides the refugees with working opportunities. The Palestinians in the camp have their own plots where they grow food-stuff for consumption or informal exchange activity. The area was previously leased by the state to Lebanese land-owners, who in turn rented it to refugees. In addition, agricultural fields are the main income source for numerous day-workers, who are picked up and driven to the fields in the morning by a foreman. One of them, 22 year old Rami, makes around 6 USD pr day from this employment. In summer he works 3-4 days a week, during the winter season when the citrus trees are picked, he works daily.

The lack of work permits for Palestinians in Lebanon does not prevent refugees from establishing their own companies, like an example from Rashidiyya shows:

63 year old Abu Rashid from the Galilee, has managed to build up his independent business. His brothers are currently his companions in their two joint companies: a company which sprays pesticide in agricultural fields and citrus plantations, and a company which rents citrus-plantations owned by Lebanese on a yearly basis. The latter is called daman-business.

Abu Rashid has only four years of schooling and worked as a day-labourer in the fields from 1948 until 1959 when he was engaged as a regular employee by two Lebanese land-owners. He worked mostly with spraying, and gradually became responsible for the whole spraying operation in a large plantation. After 14 years he had learnt everything about spraying. He bought a spraying motor together with his two brothers and a fourth Palestinian friend with their saved money, and started a private company in 1973. At the time the motor cost approximately 9,000 USD in 1994-currency. The company invested in another motor in 1975. The company has standing orders in different plantations and agricultural fields throughout the district.

All regular workers in the two companies are currently family members. Abu Rashid has 5 daughters and 5 sons, his brother Ali has 7 sons and 4 daughters, his brother Nader has 3 sons and 5 daughters. A large number of the sons and the males that are married into the family, along with the male grandchildren of age, work in the spraying company which is an all-year business. Each member receives a daily income between 15,000 - 20,000 lira (9-12 USD).

The spraying activity is an excellent advantage for Abu Rashid's other activity, the daman-company, which rents fields for farming. When he sprays the fields, Abu Rashid gets a good impression of which plantations would yield the best produce, and is thus able to rent the best fields. In the daman-company Abu Rashid and his brothers function as employers; they engage foremen who are in charge of finding seasonal workers both Palestinians and Lebanese - for the picking.

While the foremen are both Palestinians and Lebanese, most of the workers are Palestinians. Working in the field is viewed as low status activity; Lebanese who replaced Palestinian workers after the Israeli invasion in 1982 cost their employers almost double the wages of Palestinian workers (Regional Surveys of the World 1994: 619).

Abu Rashid's business is a good example of a well *incorporated* activity. His work is a very common activity among Lebanese in south Lebanon. In the area there are numerous Lebanese owned pesticide spraying companies, doing the same work as Abu Rashid, but he is the only Palestinian dealing with Lebanese customers. This means that even though he is outside the state-controlled formal economy, he is inside the informal Lebanese economy. In other words; he is not incorporated in the state economy, but very well incorporated in the informal Lebanese economy.

Another interesting point is that Palestinians in the camp are considered as cheaper labour-force than Lebanese, thus revealing a segmented labour market between Palestinian and Lebanese nationals in the agricultural sector. While the entrepreneur Abu Rashid is an example of economic incorporation, the common Palestinian land workers, with a salary half of the Lebanese worker's income, are incorporated into the Lebanese economy quite differently.

A third point to be noted is the way Abu Rashid organises his business through his family network. His kinship relations constitute the bulk of the regular work force in his companies.

Connected to the agricultural field is the sector of trading vegetables at the marketplaces downtown and inside the camps. The market prices in the camps are usually lower than outside because much of the vegetables and fruits that reach the camps are not first quality. The following example shows how the market in the Wihdat Camp in Amman functions:

The 25 year old unemployed Walid and his brother work on an irregular basis, selling fruit and vegetables at the market in Wihdat. Although this is among the biggest market places in Jordan the vendor activity is illegal. The market blocks the main road and makes it impossible for regular vehicle traffic to enter the camp from the main square where the market is situated. UNRWA has complained to the Ministry of Palestinian Affairs, because UNRWA-services like garbage collection are hindered in entering the camp through the market quarter.

The police raid the area now and then, but at a relatively high cost as tension and frustrations gets a short outburst, and the minute police leave, the sellers are back in the street. Understanding the need of small market places UNRWA started organising a system where each shelter unit had their "door" bab in an area close to the market. But the majority, and predominantly the poorest families, sold their share. Now these "babs" are replaced by different commercial stores, while those who sold their "babs" are back on the street as vendors. In order to cope with this a system of licenses for

selling was tried. But to implement this system supervision is needed, in the absence of permanent presence of the authorities the majority of vendors who sold their bab are not deterred from selling without a license. Instead the vendors have developed their own system; they have organised to keep “intruders” away from the best places to sell.

Walid's household belongs to this latter category. His father sold their bab. Walid tells that one of his relatives was taken to jail as the police tried to clean the streets. Once they took the carriage Walid had rented and kept it for 6 months. But it does not keep them from selling at the market whenever there is an urgent need for money in Walid's household. Then he and his brother or nephew, who live upstairs, sell vegetables or fruit on the street market.

The per hour outcome of this work is low. The working day starts at 5 o'clock in the morning. In the market place in Wihdat a carriage is rented for one JD (1,45 USD). The men walk pushing the carriage to the central market of Amman. At the central market all the farmers deliver their products which is then sold in boxes of vegetables and fruits to the highest bid, but at a price which officially should be inside a government fixed maximum or minimum charge. Two percent of the price is paid as taxes. Last time Walid went he bought 50 boxes of cucumbers. For one box carrying 8-10 kg he paid 1,8 JD (2,6 USD). At the market he sold the cucumber for 0,2-0,35 JD (1,3-0,5 USD) a kilo. He and his nephew worked until 19 PM. They didn't manage to sell all the cucumbers until the next day. They earned 9 JD (13 USD), 4,5 JD each. The per hour salary was in other words less than half a JD (0,7 USD).

Here we see how lack of alternatives pushes a family to depend on marginal activities, which renders very low outcome in the informal sector, and which the authorities are unsuccessful in getting under control. In this situation of hard competition and conflict with the police, Walid and the other vendors have organised themselves. Again we see how family members constitute the basic network for the business.

Trade and Transport

Palestinians with relatives spread all over the Arab and Western world, might benefit from their kinship relations which form a network for doing business.

47-year old Ahmed started his career as a taxi-driver after he and his wife fled from Dheisheh Camp to Amman after the 1967 War.

Later he started trading cars with the help of his uncle in Germany. His uncle bought the cars, and Ahmed drove them to Amman and sold them. He made good profit by this business. After two years he was able to invest in a trailer, a piece of land, and he built his own house. He then started transporting goods across the Middle East, through the port of Aqaba to Iraq and Saudi Arabia. This business is vulnerable to ups and downs in the general economic situation. Ahmed got problems repaying his loans, so he sold the trailer and bought a smaller truck. It still wasn't enough, so he had to sell the house as well (his rich uncle in Kuwait refused to help him). He complains that after the Gulf war there has been very little long-distance transport, which is what pays. One trip Aqaba-Baghdad makes around 600 JD (870 USD), but it's three months since last time his son had this trip (only his son works now, because Muhammed himself is suffering from a bad back-pain). "Before I used to advertise in the papers, but I've stopped - there is no work anymore", he says.

Ahmed claims that he and other Palestinians are openly discriminated against by the port authorities in Aqaba, where there is a queuing-system. "Often we have to wait for a long time, while Jordanian drivers with good connections with the port office get loads right away. These days, due to small amounts of goods, we don't go there and wait. We are on a telephone list, and they call us when it is our turn. So now it's difficult to know when Jordanians are cheating in the queue", he complains.

The driver believes that Jordanian colleagues are cheating in the queue, but he is not sure, and he cannot prove it. He shares a widespread conviction among Palestinians that they are systematically discriminated against when it comes to obtaining jobs and education in Jordan. When a Palestinian is refused a job, he will most likely claim that his origin was the reason, even if he cannot document that he was better qualified than the Jordanian who got the job. True or not, this suspicion towards the authorities or Jordanians in general is a disintegrating factor in itself.

Crafts and home production

Along a narrow street in the al-Taj suburb of south Amman there are five carpenter workshops on a row, making furniture, doors and building materials. One of them is newly established. The man in charge is 33 year old Fuad, who for many years worked in his brother's workshop. Four months ago he established his own, and he hopes that he will manage to run the project.

He lives in another Palestinian suburb just outside the Nasr Camp, with his wife and four children. He has rented the room for the workshop, and equipped it through credits granted by the equipment agent. He has also started the work with four employees; one is his nephew, the others are Palestinian friends, but he is still waiting for the license from the municipality to open the workshop formally. He is a bit excited about the outcome, because he has a political record; he has been a fighter in the Fatah forces in Lebanon, and was two years in Jordanian prison, after he was arrested under an illegal border-crossing some years ago. The secret police still has his passport, but he believes that he will get the permission to work now. "The situation has improved after the democratisation process started in 1989 following the parliamentary elections", he says. For a workshop like this he will have to pay 150 JD (217 USD) yearly in taxes. If he has more employees, he will have to pay more taxes, so the best is to employ your brothers, he explains. In addition, there is a special 10 JD "intifada-tax" for the government. His customers are both Jordanian and Palestinian, most of them are residents in the mixed neighbourhood of al-Taj.

Fuad is optimistic about the prospects for his business: "We had more than enough to do when I worked with my brother, so I know the market is there", he says. He is strongly in need of money because he has a private loan of 2,000 JD (2,900 USD), which he borrowed to pay for treatment for his mother in a private hospital before she died two years ago.

Fuad is following the pattern of family business; he got to know the market through his previous work with his brother who assisted him in establishing the new workshop. If he receives the license from the municipality his production will be a part of the formal Jordanian economy. He will register only three of the four paid workers though, in order to pay less taxes. He claims that tax evasion is a common way of doing business, also among Jordanian shopkeepers. His irregular part of the production is in that case a sign of that Fuad's activity is incorporated in the Jordanian economic system, which is a combination of a formal and an informal sector.

A less well paying business, though a common informal sector, is women's home based production.

Umm Nasser, a widow living in the suburb of Taybeh in south Amman, is a case in point. Since her husband died in 1967, she has made her own money by selling her impressive embroidery works, dresses and table clothes to her neighbours, who call her the best tailor in Taybeh. But most of the income of the house-

hold today comes from others in the household. The illiterate woman shares her rented five room flat with two daughters, three sons, one daughter in law and two grandsons. Four of them are working, so her home production is not the only source of income. Both daughters, Dana, 33, and Rima, 29, are working as secretaries, the youngest son Said, 27, is a salesman, and the wife of the oldest son Nasser is working in a ladies' saloon. Two of the sons, Nasser, 37, and Auni, 28, are not working for the time being. Umm Jamal's own salary is only 40-50 JD (58-72 USD) pr. month, Said makes around 75 JD (109 USD), and Rima, Dana and Nasser's wife get around 150 JD (218 USD) monthly each.

Everybody pays 40 percent of their income to common family expenses - except Taher, because he is saving money to bring his Moroccan wife to Jordan. In addition, other relatives, and neighbours come with money from time to time, usually during occasions, like Ramadan and "Id. Umm Jamal's customers are all Palestinians, because the whole Taybeh neighbourhood is inhabited by refugees originally from Dora, Umm Nasser's own village, most of which was occupied in 1948, the rest in 1967.

Umm Nasser's family shows how the collective attitude is a way of sharing scarce resources, not only for daily expenses, but also more basic life-time investments like weddings: Auni is going to marry this summer. Most of the costs will be paid by his brothers because he is unemployed,.

During periods of economic hardship, Umm Nasser has taken advantage of the very good social network in Taybeh, established on the basis of the common origin of most residents in the neighbourhood, who originally come from the village of Dora. The neighbours offer her gifts because they feel a responsibility for caring for their kin.

Services

As the younger generations of Palestinian refugees are relatively well educated, they are active in the social service and education sector. In Jordan and the West Bank refugees are employed in governmental schools and health institutions.

Haitham, a 54 year refugee from Jaffa, living with his family in Askar camp, is working both as a teacher in a UNRWA-school and as a driving teacher. He started teaching after he was refused as a pilot in the Jordanian Air Force, according to himself because of his Palestinian identity. Others in the family are also working in the social sector. One daughter works as a nurse, another, educated as a social worker, is an UNRWA welfare officer. The latter is still

unmarried and lives with her parents. This family is quite well off, not at least because UNRWA pays approximately double the wages which are paid for comparable governmental jobs. The refugees have an advantage when it comes to obtaining the attractive UNRWA-jobs, because the organisation prefers to employ refugees²¹. Haitham's eldest son, Ziad, runs many activities at the same time; he worked as an electrician in Israel at the same time as he took courses to become a driving teacher like his father. When he passed the exam, he stopped working in Israel and started working at his father's driving school. The work as a driving teacher is even better paid than UNRWA-jobs.

As we can see, this family is making a surplus of all these well paid jobs. A sign of how well off they are, is that the single daughter spends the whole UNRWA-salary of 315 JD (457 USD) monthly as she likes. Haitham decided two years ago that time had come to make a major investment; after four decades in the camp he took the step to move out. With the help of his savings he bought a house and 1,25 dunum of land, and built another storey, for the total cost of 100,000 JD (145,000 USD). Within some weeks the family will move in.

The story of Haitham is an example of a successful strategy of combination of different activities, some of which have underpinned the other; working in Israel, studying, working as a teacher, starting a driving school, and, at last, investing in land and house.

Remittances from abroad

Since the beginning of the oil boom, well paid employment in the Gulf has been an attractive option for Palestinians. After the Gulf crisis, around 300,000 returnees (Guide to UNRWA, April 1994:6), of whom the huge majority were Palestinians, came back from Kuwait to Jordan after being obliged to leave.

A common strategy was to save money for later investments in land or education. In some cases the whole family moved to the Gulf, in other cases only one in the family went there for a period, while sending money back home.

The new suburb of Umm Nuwwara in Amman was established in 1992, built specially for the Gulf returnees. The residents are disillusioned by the sudden change from a relatively wealthy life in Kuwait to their poor life in Jordan. The shopkeeper Auni in the

¹⁹ An advertisement for a supply control officer in the Lebanese daily *an-Nahar*, July, 16, 1994 provides an example

main street, originally from a village close to Hebron, went to Saudi Arabia in 1961 where he worked as a teacher. He kept in touch with his family, and went to see them every summer. After the occupation of the West Bank, his family went to the Souf camp in Jordan, while he went to Kuwait, also working as a teacher. He sent one part of his salary to his family, and saved the other part. In 1976 he had saved enough money to buy a piece of land and build a house without taking up loans. He continued working in Kuwait, but had to return to Amman in 1990 where he now lives with his wife, a cousin who also works as an UNRWA-teacher, and six children. Today he has his daily work in the small shop he opened by the savings from Kuwait.

Another option for increasing a household's economic assets is to migrate to the West in order to find work. This is more difficult than finding work in the Gulf, due to the strict visa-practices by most western countries. Also it is a more expensive option. The far distance also means that the contact might not be very regular. Abu Ghassan's son who is studying in the Philippines, considers going to the US when he finishes this year. His father doesn't want him to emigrate, but if the son goes there, he says that he knows for sure that the son will send money to him and the rest of the family.

A third option for acquiring "external" remittances is the West Bank. Many of the 1967-refugees left their farmed land behind, which later was run by their relatives. The Jenin-resident Nayef was working in Algeria at the time of the 1967 War, and was thus barred from returning to his family. He settled in Amman where he lives with his wife and seven children. He has received remittances from his brother regularly who farms the land. The amount changes according to the harvest; last year Nayef's share was 700 JD (1,015 USD).

Receiving remittances from abroad is affecting the refugees' ties with the host country. When their main income source is from outside, the refugees become less economically dependent on the host country.

Land investments

The influx of refugees from the occupied territories has driven the land prices in neighbouring countries upwards. Many Palestinians have managed to take advantage of the land price increase by buying and selling land, often buying from locals and selling to other Palestinians.

The retired bulldozer driver, Abu Ghassan, was one of the lucky ones, when he, after he had been working some years in Saudi Arabia was able to buy two pieces of land in 1976. He built a house on one of them, and

moved with his family out of Nasr camp. Ten years later, he sold the other piece, which had cost him 4,000 JD, for a price of 13,000 JD, thus making a good profit, which was used to send his brightest son to the Philippines to study civil engineering.

Abu Rashid and his brothers in Lebanon (mentioned on page 66) also invested money in land. Instead of spending all the profit from the pesticide company on their daily expenses, they chose to buy a piece of land outside Tyre. The brothers built a four-storey building, and succeeded in selling the apartments in 1986, profiting thereby from the land bought some years earlier.

Investment in land or other property differs in certain aspects from other types of economic activities. The outcome is based on a long term strategy more than most other income generating activities. Furthermore, refugees who own land in the host country, establish economic ties in the area they reside in which those without property have not. Investment in land is thus an activity that attaches the refugees to the locality, and therefore might affect their future mobility.

Depending on UNRWA and Charities

Those refugees who are not able to meet their basic needs for food and shelter, are defined as Special Hardship Cases by the UNRWA, and receive rations from the organisation. Out of the 2,9 million registered refugees by the end of 1993, 166.987 are registered as SHC-clients (Guide to UNRWA, April 1994). UNRWA's criteria to be accepted as a SHC are strict, and all SHC-cases are subject to detailed investigation by UNRWA staff.

70 year old Zeinab in Askar Camp in the West Bank has headed her household since she became a widow 15 years ago. Zeinab has received SHC-support for some periods. She has eight daughters and three sons. Today two sons and two daughters are living in her house. One of the daughters (36), came back home in 1991, after she had worked ten years as an English teacher in Oman. She is still looking for work. The other daughter (32) is a nursery teacher, but is not able to find any work. One of the sons (45) receives his own SHC-help because he has diabetes and has psychological problems. The other son, Abbas (24) was clever at school, but is currently without work. Zeinab tells that Abbas, after he was beaten badly by Israeli soldiers in 1989, left for Amman to continue his studies, where he received 100 JD (145 USD) from the PLO office. His two sisters working in Oman paid for his studies until they both returned after the Gulf War. Until Abbas

returned home in 1992, the family received SHC-support. When he came back, Zeinab lost the SHC-status she had for two years, because Abbas was over 18 years old and was supposed to be able to work. But he did not find any work, and the family could not afford to let him finish the studies, specially after his sisters came back from the Gulf and UNRWA cut the welfare program. Today, Zeinab's family is dependent on economic help from her married daughters who are not living at home. The daughter bring food to their mother's household each day, and sometimes give her money. Abbas does not feel good about the situation: "It is the boys" obligation to provide for their parents, but with our family it is the girls who help my mother most", he says. Zeinab explains that she always encouraged the children to study, because they did not have the option of farming the land which they lost when they left their village near Jaffa in 1948. "But we could not afford to give all the children education. So it was the youngest girls who got the best education", she says.

In Zeinab's case we see a type of combined strategy with long-term goals; two daughters were sent to the Gulf to work. The surplus from the salaries was invested in education for the other children. The daughters who worked in Oman sent home money regularly and paid for the education of their brother Abbas. Zeinab harvested the fruits of the investment in the education of her youngest two daughters until the Gulf war broke out in 1991. When the daughters were forced to leave the Gulf, Zeinab stopped receiving overseas revenues and her household increased by two unemployed members. Abbas was also forced to stop his studies because his sisters could not pay for him any longer. Having an 18-year old son no longer studying, Abbas was theoretically able to feed the household accruing to UNRWA's guidelines. Zeinab therefore did not fill the requirements for receiving UNRWA's SHC-support any longer and lost it.

Zeinab, however, uses her kinship to gain access to resources outside her own household. Three daughters, married and living outside Zeinab's household, bring both food and money in order to maintain the material and physical needs of their mother's household. Such food transfers do not reveal the redistributive mechanism active in preserving the self-sufficiency of a certain household (Moore 1988:61-62). Food is transferred from an external household, in our case-Zeinab's daughters, and redistributed at the point of consumption in Zeinab's household.

The case also illustrates two other points. First, SHC-support is useful to a certain point, but this support proves ineffective when the basic

transfers provided by other household members terminate. Second, daughters are as important as sons when it comes in implementing combined strategies of economic adaptation. Whether sponsoring the education of their brothers or feeding their kin, females support their parents' household despite marriage and the establishment of separate households.

Activities in political and national institutions

Some political groups pay well for their employees, making political activities as a source of income. In addition to regular salaries and pensions, PLO has traditionally provided funds for families of martyrs, imprisoned or deportees, and it has provided politically active and good students with scholarships abroad. These funds, which especially dominated the Palestinian economy in Lebanon, have been reduced due to PLO's financial difficulties since 1990. But Palestinian institutions still exist in Lebanon: Abu Hassan from Nablus and Abu Fadi from Gaza are both working in the PLO-administration of Rashidiyya camp. As 1967-refugees they are paid special attention to by the PLO because they are deprived of the basic UNRWA-services. Abu Hassan guards the camp entrance, while Abu Fadi works in the Palestine Red Crescent Society's (PRCS) hospital in the camp. PRCS is one of the main employers among the national institutions run by the PLO.

There are still well paid officials at the different PLO offices and embassies around in the Arab countries. A Fatah-veteran, working with security-related issues in Amman, says he earns 500 JD (725 USD) monthly. Another top official of the PRCS would not tell how much he earns, but he pays 2,000 JD (2,900 USD) a year on his house in Amman, which he rented after he came from Kuwait four years ago, and he uses another 2,000 JD (2,900 USD) yearly on his children's private education. Now, when the Palestinian National Authority is building up an administration apparatus in the self-rule areas, many political activists both inside and outside the territories expect to get a position in the self-administered areas.

Conclusion

Let us turn back to the opening question of this chapter: How have Palestinian refugees adapted economically in the communities where they live? We note some crucial differences between the economic conditions in the three areas we have studied. In Lebanon, the Palestinians do not

get work permits, and are thus excluded from the legal labour market. In Jordan, Palestinians have formal rights as citizens, but complaints about discrimination are common. Refugees in the West Bank have to relate to an economy functioning under occupation.

The Palestinians, with their wide varieties of socio-economic background have reacted to these economic challenges by applying a range of strategies of adaptation. The strategy can be characterised by whether it is based on one or several activities, or whether it based on short- or long term output motives.

The case-studies show examples of the process of choosing between different income generating activities, adapted to the specific local conditions. We have seen that it is possible to take advantage of the lack of state control in Lebanon, like Abu Rashid, who managed to incorporate into the local informal economy. His case has some noteworthy features: He used his family as labour when expansion was required for his spraying business, thus keeping a better grip on the outcome. He combined different activities; spraying, renting land for farming, and building dwellings for rent.

In another case, the truck driver Ahmed in Amman who used his uncle as an agent for importing cars, showing how refugees can turn their Diaspora situation, with relatives spread in many countries, to advantage for doing international business. He was a bit more unlucky, probably because he was dependent on one activity, and did not manage to keep on through a down-period.

In the West Bank, the very productive family of Haitham combined secure jobs in UNRWA with a profitable driving school, making it possible to move out from the camp without taking up loans. An important economic adaptation to the occupation situation has been to work in Israel, where salaries are higher than in the West Bank. The intifada and the border closure have limited this option, but it is still there, on a lower scale.

Many of the cases show how important the construction of social network is; in cases where there has been a good network, like in some family enterprises, there is a solid base for productivity. Others, without close kinship and relation networks - like the driver Ahmed, whose uncle refused to help him when Ahmad faced certain difficulties, lack this social security base.

When it comes to incorporation, the fieldwork findings indicate that Palestinians have succeeded, in different degrees, in incorporate with the local informal sector, but not necessarily into the formal sector.

Furthermore, both successful and less successful families, there is a widespread pooling of resources; for the rich family, savings can be used for collective investments, for the poorer, the collective attitude is a tool for reallocation of resources and social security. Thus, the strategy of combination of different activities to underpin long time concerns seems to have been at easier access for those refugees who from the beginning had some economic resources.

Conclusion

Palestinians have since 1948 been dispersed in different countries in and outside the Middle East. They display a range of coping strategies for survival in an every-day life which many, to a certain extent, do not have control over. The ever-changing political environments, for instance, have created insecure conditions which have affected the construction of viable Palestinian households. Military upheavals such as the 1948 and the 1967 wars, the 1970 civil strife in Jordan, the 14-year long civil war in Lebanon, the intifada which started in the Occupied Territories in 1987, and the Gulf war of 1990-91 are political events which have affected the settlement pattern of Palestinians in new localities more than one time and thereby affected the daily lives.

Seen from this perspective, an observer is apt to indicate that Palestinians live in an atmosphere distinguished by permanent change and fluctuation. While this observation holds true for those who have been involuntarily uprooted more than two times during their lifetime, we have nevertheless chosen to focus on the way Palestinians have coped with their refugee-existence and the strategies they have applied in order to survive outside their homeland.

Our main concern in this report has thus been to highlight the variety of processes Palestinians have been part of, and the divergent strategies that have been implemented when responding to changing environments.

As a collective body, Palestinians are still regarded by the international community as refugees. Palestinians also still perceive themselves as bearing a collective refugee-status. However, they have, at the individual and household levels, adapted in various ways to their environments, whether these have been different states, communities or neighbourhoods.

In the introduction we outlined four main strategies of adaptation, namely assimilation, segregation, incorporation and migration. The cases presented show varying mixtures of these strategies.

What we find as striking similarities between the settings is a certain unity in the kinds of responses taken by individual Palestinians and their households when the resources at hand have been similar. Likewise, the lack of these resources also engender comparable responses. In this report we have tried to trace some of these responses made by Palestinians residing in different refugee camps, and to a certain extent, by those living

outside camps. The resources do not necessarily represent material goods and capital. Resources also include:

- a) the family as a collective network;
- b) favourable legal regulations governing the Palestinian presence;
- c) accumulated knowledge in the form of specialised vocations and education;
- d) access to economically profitable labour markets;
- c) networks over geographical boundaries.

The first resource, family networks and collectives, is a key-variable for understanding the multiple forms and composition of coping strategies applied by refugees. Households, for instance, operate as a collective economic entity where household members pool parts or all of their income. If one member participates in the labour market, he or she is able to increase another household member's career opportunity by investing in that member's education. In the long run, investment in one member's education-expenses is seen to increase the opportunities available to the whole household. Individuals thus perceive their interests as compatible to the interests of the collective they are members in.

In all four settings we find examples where family networks have been instrumental when Palestinian households have adapted to their environments. In some cases family networks are incorporated into their surroundings such as the case of Fuad (presented on page 69) who has established a carpenter workshop in Amman and settled right outside the Nasr camp. In other cases, family networks have constituted segregated entities within the society. Maher in Askar (presented on page 50) lived outside the camp for three years but did not incorporate in the new neighbourhood. He chose to move back to the camp mainly because it was the place where his relatives reside.

At times, we are able to observe adaptation strategies which illustrate both incorporation and segregation depending on the context in which the adaptation process has taken place. Abu Rashid and his family in Lebanon (presented on page 66), for instance, are incorporated in the economic sphere of the country in which they reside in. However, the members of the extended family continue to reside in Rashidiyya, a camp clearly segregated from the surrounding society, although they own a four-storey building outside the camp. A segregated settlement-pattern is thereby exhibited which does not necessarily reflect the overall adaptation of the family in the country they reside in.

The second type of resources which significantly affect the adaptation process of Palestinians in the states they reside in are the degree of favourable legal regulations. The legal framework found in each state has long been underestimated as an important factor when the situation of Palestinians in different states in the Middle East was compared. The possession or non-possession of vital documents such as residency permits, working permits, UNRWA-registration cards, ID-cards and citizenship, provide states with control mechanisms which individual Palestinians have to succumb to. Legal regulations thus create a situation of insecurity to the very existence of Palestinians in the places where they reside whenever individuals do not fulfil the requirements set by the states. If the option of migration to other countries where the personal security is better is not available or possible due to economic reasons or legal requirements, many Palestinians are thus forced to live in a security situation marked by a high degree of uncertainty.

The government in Lebanon has not been favourable towards the Palestinian presence on its territory, mainly due to the country's fragile state-structure. Legally defined as foreigners residing in the country, Palestinians have developed a segregated economy mainly because working permits have been scarce, but also as a result of the civil war. Refugee camps exist as segregated communities where Palestinians are uneasy and anxious about their future right to remain in the country. This anxiety will increase if the current peace process does not offer viable alternatives for their current legal insecure presence in Lebanon.

Jordan, on the other hand, has applied a policy of integration in regard to legal regulations where the large bulk of Palestinians from the West Bank have received Jordanian citizenships. The result has been partly one of assimilation, especially in the case of Palestinians who have been able to invest in Jordan either by buying land or operating enterprises. However, having acquired financial assets in the form of houses and enterprises in the state where Palestinians reside does not necessarily result in stronger incentives of belonging to Jordan. Rather, an economically well-off situation creates room for independent actions which several respondents exposed. The cases of Abu Ghassan who previously lived in Nasr camp in Amman (presented on page 43) and Dr. Ja'far (presented on page 47) indicate that, depending on the opportunities available, they do not necessarily prefer to settle in Jordan. Abu Ghassan was not certain whether to build a house for his son now that the question of return to the West Bank is being discussed. Likewise, Dr. Ja'far preferred to live in the Gulf but was forced to settle in Jordan following the Gulf war of 1991.

The policy of integration in Jordan where the Palestinian population has been naturalised as Jordanians has not achieved its aim, a uniform Jordanian identity has yet to evolve. On the one hand, Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin still nourish their Palestinian roots. Special arenas, such as the Palestinian societies, have been created where Palestinians are able to exercise and manifest their identity as Palestinians. On the other hand, it is apparent that many Palestinians reside in Jordan mainly due to the lack of opportunity for residing elsewhere; they have either been prevented from settling in the West bank during the Israeli occupation, or they have fled from the Gulf as a result of the 1991 Gulf war.

On the West Bank, we have the special situation of a refugee community living among a native community where both communities are constituted of Palestinians living under Israeli rule. Both refugees and natives have thus endured the politics of occupation where Palestinians have depended on the Israeli authorities' issuing of viable ID-cards, travel documents and work permits.

The third resource indicated as important elements of an adaptation process is the accumulation of knowledge in the form of specialised apprenticeship or education. We observed that the inhabitants of the other four refugee camps in this study belong predominantly to the group of refugees who lost their main source of livelihood- land- after their exodus. Current camp residents had thus, as a starting point, less means to choose their places of residence and the kinds of economic activity they could participate in. Camps evolved thus as segregated communities and developed into distinguishable neighbourhoods.

In cases where camp residents sought to increase the resources at hand, many applied a strategy where investment in education and vocational training created increased opportunities for multiple-choice careers. The opportunities created enabled many to either move out of the camp and incorporate into the neighbouring communities or emigrate to another country in order to further increase. The case of Zeinab in the camp of Askar (presented on page 74) illustrates how a family of peasant background strengthened its coping strategies by investing in the education of the youngest members who were able to migrate and work in Oman creating thus a surplus which was reinvested in the education of other household members.

The availability of external labour markets where wages are higher than the local labour markets offer a fourth option where Palestinians have been able to increase the opportunities at hand thereby establishing more viable coping strategies. Palestinians who have crossed the green-line

dividing the West Bank and Israel and sought work in the Israeli labour market have been able to earn manifold the wages they would have earned in their local labour market. The strengthening of coping strategies does not only imply obtaining higher wages. The case of Jamal from Askar (presented on page 36) indicates how future opportunities were sought not only by working in Israel, but also by making an engagement with an Arab Israeli girl. Jamal and his family perceived this alliance, initiated in the labour market, as increasing the economic capabilities of the family as well as the legal and social potential of the family as a collective. West Bankers who work in the Israeli labour market display one form of incorporation between the Palestinian refugee community and the surrounding environment which is entered into in specific limited ways.

Adaptation through migration represents the fifth type of resource available to a large number of Palestinian householdmembers living both inside and outside camps. Perhaps paradoxically, migration appears to be one of the most rewarding coping strategies available to Palestinians, although in its essence, it represents a measure of physical withdrawal from the society in which Palestinian reside. For apparent reasons, it was not possible to portray the situation of emigrants during our fieldwork simply because they were not present. We argue, however, that when members from a certain household have been able to migrate, to the Gulf countries or to the West, the social network of the household as a collective becomes significantly enlarged. This enlargement of social networks has had crucial economic consequences for householdmembers. Members who have migrated have been able to send remittances, they have alleviated the financial condition of households by sponsoring the education, health and living expenses of other members of the household.

While social mobilisation in the local society is linked to factors such as social class and regional background, migration introduces an alternative adaptation strategy. By enlarging the social network of refugees, members of the Palestinian Diaspora become increasingly mobile. This mobility, however, is to a large extent dependent on regulations set by the state in which Palestinians reside as well as by foreign countries and the international community. These constraints illustrate on the one hand the limits which Palestinians face in their effort to maximise the opportunities available to them. On the other hand, these constraints also illustrate the external character of obstacles which Palestinians face in their effort to saw roots in the places where they reside. Palestinians are, more than other residents in the societies in which they live, to a large extent dependent on stable external factors in order to be able to plan short- and long-term objectives. The emergence of wars, internal strife and civil wars in

the states where Palestinians have settled, as well as the insecure state-policies form structural external determinants which Palestinians have not been able to control. To a large extent, the external nature of these determinants have engendered types of adaptation strategies which would not have crystallised had the external structures been more stable.

Appendix 1: Words and abbreviations

Arabic words used in the text

<i>'amm:</i>	father's brother
<i>baladiyya:</i>	village council
<i>bet:</i>	house, home
<i>daman-business:</i>	literally, guarantee-business, a form of yearly rent-contract of agricultural land found in south Lebanon.
<i>dar:</i>	compound household
<i>hamula:</i>	patrilineal descent group, i.e. a corporate clan tracing descent in the male line.
<i>hara:</i>	neighbourhood, quarter
<i>hisar:</i>	siege of the refugee camps in Lebanon during the Camps War in 1985/86.
<i>intifada:</i>	Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza, started in December 1987.
<i>khal:</i>	mother's brother
<i>wasta:</i>	connection, bribe

Abbreviations

DoP	Declaration of Principles
PIP	Peace Implementation Programme
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PRCS	Palestinian Red Crescent Society
SHC	Special Hardship Case
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency

Currencies

1 Jordanian Dinar (JD)	= 1,6 USD
1 Lebanese Lira (LL)	= 0,0006 USD

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Finding Ways

The Declaration of Principles (DoP) between the PLO and Israel has profoundly altered the political, social and economic developments in the Middle East. Palestinians are apt to respond in diverse ways to the DoP, as they have to the wide range of political events and economic shocks which have affected their daily life since 1948.

These responses take a variety of forms, and the purpose of the present report is to document some of the strategies and adaptations that the Palestinians have made in the context of a rapidly changing socio-political environment. The report focuses on the way Palestinians have coped with their refugee-existence, and the strategies they have applied in order to survive outside their homeland.

The data on which this report is founded were produced during four field works in July 1994 in Jordan, Lebanon and the West Bank. Each field work lasted for about a month, and anthropological methods were used.

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