


Assisted Return: Why Not Trust A Host State?

Erlend Paasche

Fafo, Oslo, 21.10.2016

Asylum decisions, 2005-15



25-60 prosent

REJECTED

Assisted return as a 'win-win'?

For the host state


- More humane
- Less controversial
- More cost effective
- Legitimises forced return

For migrants

- Allows for return with dignity
- Allows for planning
- Offers incentives
- Allows for re-migration

The 'paradox' of low programme uptake

Figure 1. Number of asylum applications to Norway per year and the number of rejected asylum seekers.



* Rejections 1st instance (UDI) not including Dublin cases. Source UDI. 2014 number for IOM applicants is estimated based on data for 1st trimester (multiplied by 3).

Locating trust in the stages of assisted return

1. Sign-up for return
2. Pre-departure assistance
3. Flight
4. Post-return assistance

Locating trust in the stages of assisted return

1. Sign-up for return




The state is trusted

2. Pre-departure assistance


3. Flight

4. Post-return assistance



The state's trustworthiness is retroactively established

Locating trust: The paradox dissolves



Buying a pig in a poke requires trust

The often existential decision to return is made by rejected asylum seekers largely on the basis of **trust** in the state's assurances...

- Asylum will not be granted – though how can one know for sure?
- Deportation to origin is a credible threat – yet it happens rarely
- Post-return assistance will be delivered – but what if it won't?

Migrants' reasons to distrust the host state

From the perspective of a rejected asylum seeker, he

- is to **trust a state that distrusts him, and seeks to return him**
- typically comes from a low-trust state
- would return to a high-corruption state and outsourced assistance
- is largely unable to sanction an eventual violation of trust

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Empirical findings


Assisted return to Iraq (Strand et al. 2011)

- Returnees reported that IOM did not deliver assistance.
- Transnational rumours of corruption.




Assisted return to Afghanistan (Strand et al. 2016, Deloitte 2016)

- Strong suspicions of corruption in IOM Kabul
- UDI halts the assisted return programme and revises its auditing routines.



Who's responsible if trust is violated?



Empirical findings

- Paasche, 2016.

Return Migration and Corruption: Experiences of Iraqi Kurds